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INTRODUCTION
One of the fundamental goals of a patent system is to encourage the research and
development of the most socially valuable inventions—those innovations that will produce the
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greatest benefits for society at large. If the government could determine in advance which
inventions are most socially valuable, it could simply offer direct rewards for their development.1
The fact that the United States has chosen to employ patents rather than direct rewards to
encourage innovation reflects a decision to decentralize the task of picking winners. This policy
choice is premised on the notion that, if inventors or the market are in a better position than the
government to identify valuable innovations, the government should delegate the task by
granting inventors a patent as a reward for innovation.2 Patents entitle inventors to monopoly
profits from an innovation,3 and monopoly profits tend to increase as the social value of an
innovation increases.4 Thus, the patent system generally encourages inventors to work on what
they believe will be the most valuable inventions.
This rationale for choosing a patent system over a reward system explains why the
government may choose to grant patents in the first place. It does not explain, however, why the
government sometimes takes patents away after they have been granted. These patent
revocations are commonly triggered when the defendant in a patent infringement case
successfully challenges the validity of the patent held by the plaintiff.5 The logic behind patent
challenges and revocations is that the government, when implementing a patent system, might
accidentally give out patents to entities that did not innovate or did not need a reward in order to
innovate.6 Such invalid patents have no upside: they do not encourage innovation, and they
impose deadweight losses on welfare. In short, patent challenges weed out invalid patents.7
1

See Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights, 44 J.L. & ECON. 525,
534–36 (2001); see also Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J.
ECON. 1137, 1137–38 (1998) (“Under symmetric information and full commitment, the first-best solution to
underprovision of ideas is subsidizing research, rather than creating a new set of monopoly price distortions through
the patent system. However, before research is conducted, the government may not know the costs and expected
benefits of research, and may not even be able to conceive of some inventions.” (citations omitted)).
2
Of course there are other reasons one might still prefer a reward system to a patent system. For example, a reward
system that released the innovation into the public domain would impose less deadweight loss to welfare. The
information advantage of inventors is a necessary but not sufficient condition to preferring patents over rewards.
3
Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 1, at 529.
4
This claims rests on the absence of any a priori reason why the fraction of social surplus extracted by a monopolist
rises or falls with the size of that surplus. See infra section I.A.
5
Patents can also be revoked via administrative proceedings before the Patent and Trademark Office. See 35 U.S.C.
§§ 301 –329 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
6
The likely reason for these mistakes is that the Patent and Trademark Office must make decisions about which
applicants deserve patents with very little information about their innovation beyond that which the applicant itself
provides. Peer review does not come until later, when profit sharing becomes a motive for an infringer to provide the
government with more balanced information about the validity of a patent. See infra section I.B.
7
Scholars have criticized patent law for making mistakes in weeding out socially worthless patents. The gist of the
argument is that the criteria patent law employs to judge the validity of, say, utility patents—novelty, nonobviousness, and utility—do not perfectly identify those innovations that improve social welfare, as an economist
might define it. Accordingly, the argument goes, these criteria do not successfully induce valuable innovation while
deterring socially worthless research. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER
BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6–8 (2003), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf; ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS:
HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 24–
35 (2004); Jay Dratler, Jr., Alice in Wonderland Meets the U.S. Patent System, 38 AKRON L. REV. 299 (2005). We
share these concerns, but we have little to add to them and they do not affect the arguments we make later in the text
about the problem with patent challenges and potential reforms to improve those challenges. Therefore, we proceed
under the assumption that the law determining which patents are valid operates as a reasonable proxy for which

There are two problems, however, with patent challenges. In some cases they impose costs
on valid patents, and in other cases they fail against invalid patents. These flaws stem from two
sources. First, infringers occasionally bring challenges even when patents are valid, causing the
holders of valid patents to bear litigation costs in responding to a patent challenge. At the same
time, alleged infringers may fail to challenge all holders of invalid patents, allowing these patents
to continue imposing deadweight loss. Second, occasionally courts may make an error when
judging whether a patent is valid or invalid. This may cause the holder of what is truly a valid
patent to lose that patent or allow an invalid patent to stand. These failures decrease the ex ante
returns to any innovation that deserves a valid patent, undermining the incentives at the core of
the patent system, and increase the social costs of the patent system.
Moreover, these failures are most acute in cases involving the most socially valuable patents
and the largest firms. Whereas the patent system seeks to decentralize the choice of innovation,
patent litigation also decentralizes the decision to challenge a patent. Specifically, it delegates the
decision to private parties, ideally potential entrants into the patent holder’s market. However,
there may be few firms in a position to challenge a patent and large fixed litigation costs to filing
a challenge. Thus challengers tend to target holders of the most profitable and (and often most
socially valuable) patents.8 Smaller patent holders are particularly vulnerable because they
cannot afford substantial litigation costs. By implication, challengers tend to avoid taking on
larger firms because there is a lower likelihood of succeeding against even an invalid patent held
by such firms.9 This discourages innovation at smaller firms and tolerates socially harmful
patents held by larger firms.
At bottom, the problems with patent challenges are primarily attributable to judicial and
administrative errors. If the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) granted only valid patents, or if
the courts could be trusted to uphold all valid patents and strike down all invalid ones, our
system of patent challenges would function almost perfectly. Yet errors are endemic throughout

patents (and the inventions they protect) increase social welfare. We shall focus instead on errors in application of
that law by courts.
8
C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, When Do Generics Challenge Drug Patents?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD.
613, 632 (2011).
9
Michaxel J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1234
(2008) (detailing numerous advantages of large firms over small firms in the use of intellectual property for profit
and in litigation).
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all levels of the process. The PTO issues scores of invalid patents every year,10 and the federal
courts are notoriously inaccurate when adjudicating patent validity.11
If judicial and administrative inaccuracy is the disease, then improving that accuracy would
seem the most obvious cure. Indeed, proposals to reduce the error rate within the federal courts
and the PTO are legion and involve everything from increased funding and technical training to
full-scale restructuring of the judicial process.12 Nonetheless, the patent system’s endemic errors
and inaccuracies have proven notoriously resilient in the face of ongoing ameliorative efforts.13 It
may be that there are upper limits to the level of precision that generalist judges can bring to a
system involving such technically complex subject matters, for instance.14
In this Article, we suggest that it might be possible to improve the value of patent challenges
even without increasing their accuracy. Put simply, we propose raising the stakes involved in
patent litigation. A patent owner who prevails at trial should collect enhanced rewards, above
and beyond the damages the owner would normally be paid in compensation for the
infringement. A patent owner whose patent is invalidated at trial should be forced to pay
significantly enhanced penalties. At first glance, our proposal might seem entirely
counterintuitive. If patent adjudications are riddled with errors, one would think that it would be
preferable to lower the stakes involved, rather than increase them. Scholars and courts have
largely confined themselves to that approach.15
Yet contrary to the conventional wisdom, we demonstrate that enhanced rewards and
penalties can correct many of the flaws inherent to patent challenges even without affecting the
accuracy of the adjudications themselves. They accomplish this by restoring patent holders’ net
expected trial outcomes to appropriate levels.16 Enhanced rewards would compensate holders of
10

E.g., JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 7, at 32–33 (describing a patent granted based on the “determination that
surrounding jam with peanut butter so the bread will not get soggy is a new idea, and one that was not previously
obvious to skilled sandwich-makers”); Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. L.
REV. 1495, 1495 & n.1 (2001) (“Complaints are legion.”); Mark Lemley, Doug Lichtman & Bhaven Sampat, What
To Do About Bad Patents?, REGULATION, Winter 2005–2006, at 10, 10 (2005) (“Bad patents are everywhere.”);
Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption Of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 47
(2007) (arguing that PTO grants “patents that should never have been issued” because of presumption of validity in
judicial review); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for
Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 589 (1999) (noting that “patents for
‘business methods’ implemented in software . . . are of extremely poor quality”); Michael J. Meurer, Patent
Examination Priorities, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 675, 676 (2009) (describing how “PTO struggles to improve
examination quality”).
11
See David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in
Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223, 258–59 (2008) (demonstrating that even sophisticated and experienced
federal courts struggle with patent cases).
12
We describe and critique these various proposals in section III.A, infra.
13
See, e.g., NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004)
(describing a continuing crisis within the patent system); Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s Embrace
of Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 713, 737 (2007) (describing “a
growing patent crisis”); see also Schwartz, supra note 11, at 258–59 (demonstrating that judges to not appear to
improve as they gain experience with patent cases).
14
See infra section III.A.
15
See infra notes 82–84 and accompanying text.
16
In a way, our proposal is related to Gary Becker’s observation that deterrence is a function of the probability of
apprehension times the fine paid upon apprehension. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 172, 180 (1968). Focusing on improving the accuracy of courts is akin to changing
the probability of apprehension, although our proposal to raise stakes is akin to changing the criminal fine. Our

valid, valuable patents for the risks they run at trial. This would incentivize the optimal amount
of research and innovation, as well as continued research on the most socially valuable
inventions. At the same time, enhanced penalties would reduce or eliminate invalid patent
owners’ opportunities to earn positive returns at trial, vastly diminishing their incentives to assert
their invalid patents in the first place.17
The enhanced rewards and penalties we propose would thus allow our imperfect patent
system to mimic one in which courts erred less frequently. Patent owners—be they genuine
innovators or patent trolls—and their competitors would behave as if they could rely upon the
courts to reach the correct outcome in essentially every case. The system would generate
substantial benefits to innovation and competition at minimal cost. Where direct efforts to
improve judicial accuracy have failed, raising the stakes of patent cases might yet succeed.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the manner in which patents direct research
and innovation toward the most socially valuable inventions and describes the value of patent
challenges. Part II analyzes the problems created by patent challenges when courts err in
assessing the validity of patents. Part III presents our proposal for enhanced rewards and
penalties and offers a theoretical demonstration of its ability to realign research and litigation
incentives. Part IV suggests a useful refinement that would involve tailoring the availability of
enhanced remedies and penalties to particular industries or technical fields and examines several
important issues surrounding the implementation and effects of our approach.
I. THE LOGIC BEHIND PATENTS AND PATENT CHALLENGES
In this Part, we first examine the rationale behind the existence of patents and then the
process by which patents are granted and revoked.
A. PATENTS AND PROPORTIONAL REWARDS

The patent system is premised on the idea that an inventor’s payoff for innovation should be
proportional to the ex post social surplus from that innovation.18 Our evidence is that the payoff
to the inventor of possessing a patent is the monopoly profits from having the exclusive right to
market her innovation. Monopoly profits are not special in and of themselves. Indeed, monopoly
pricing is in general associated with deadweight loss to welfare, which is typically considered a
cost of the patent system. However, monopoly profits have the useful feature that they roughly
scale with the social surplus from an innovation. In other words, the patent on an innovation with
proposal is also related, though less directly, to Keith Hylton’s observation that the enforcer’s dilemma that
plaintiffs face can be overcome by type II errors by courts. In other words, plaintiffs can be encouraged to litigate by
courts who accidentally rule for them. See Keith L. Hylton, Costly Litigation and Legal Error Under Negligence, 6
J. L., ECON. & ORG. 433, 434 (1990). We make an opposite point: court (and PTO) errors in favor of patent holders
can be overcome by increasing the penalties that invalid patent holders pay when their patent is invalidated.
17
Our proposal resembles, but is distinct from, the English Rule, which requires that the losing party in a civil
litigation compensate the prevailing party for its direct litigation costs. First, our remedy allows an increase in
damages that substantially exceed the cost of litigation. Second, we advocate disconnecting the amount that the
prevailing party received from the amount that the losing party pays. For example, we advocate giving prevailing
patent holders patent extensions, though those patent extensions would not be paid for by infringers. See infra
section III.D.
18
By ex post social surplus we mean the consumer plus producer surplus from an invention after it is developed.
This surplus excludes the cost of research required to develop the invention.
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twice the social value of another will typically generate twice the monopoly profits of the other.
The reason is that, of the factors that determine monopoly profits (the level of demand, the slope
of demand, the ability to price discriminate, and competition from other patents), only the level
of demand must a priori scale with social value.19 There is no theoretical reason why the other
factors are correlated with the ex post social surplus from an invention.
The reason why the patent system seeks to scale rewards with ex post social surplus is not
primarily that this scaling is, in general, the optimal strategy for encouraging innovation. It is
easy enough to see that, for example, if there are diminishing returns to rewards or increasing
cost to the use of rewards, then rewards should be roughly concave in the ex post surplus from an
innovation.20 Rewards in turn may have diminishing returns because individuals have
diminishing marginal utility of income and thus inventors exert less incremental effort as reward
rises.21 And the cost of rewards may be increasing if there are fixed costs to entering a patent
race, so that multiple inventors only compete when the reward is large enough to cover their
fixed costs.
Rather, the main reason why the patent system provides rewards that are proportional to ex
post social surplus from an innovation is that the government does not know which innovations
actually enhance social welfare. The system functions under the assumption that potential
inventors and the market have better knowledge about the value of their invention. To encourage
inventors to exert most of their effort on developing innovations that are socially productive, the
system uses the incentive of a reward that scales with ex post social surplus.22 In other words, the
proportional reward from patents is the solution to a principal–agent problem in which the
19

For a definition of consumer surplus and its relationship to both the demand curve and social welfare, see Daniel
T. Slesnick, Empirical Approaches to the Measurement of Welfare, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 2108, 2110–13 (1998).
20
We can demonstrate this with a simple model similar to that employed by Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 1,
at 530–32. Suppose the probability of generating an invention is

where

is the reward for an innovation,

is

the social value from an invention,
is the cost of providing a reward. Costs might include the costs of a patent
race or simply the costs of administering a patent system. The social welfare accounting for the reward is
. The level of reward that maximizes social welfare satisfies the condition
is, the marginal benefits of rewards must equal their marginal costs. Because rewards

and social value

, that
are

complements, i.e.,
, and the upper bound on rewards,
, obviously increases with ,
the optimal reward is increasing in the social value of the innovation by Topkis’s Monotonicity Theorem. Donald M.
Topkis, Minimizing a Submodular Function on a Lattice, 26 OPERATIONS RES. 305, 317 (1978). Moreover, it is
and
are linear or the upper bound on rewards is binding, the optimal reward is
easily verified that, unless
nonlinear.
21
This concern vanishes if innovations are created by firms which are held by diversified shareholders and thus do
not experience diminishing marginal utility of income. Of course, some innovations are made by individuals or
privately held firms with limited shareholders. And even in large corporations, agency problems between managers
and shareholders can mimic the results from diminishing marginal utility of income. This is most evident when the
chief executive is paid a fraction of profits; because the chief executive experiences diminishing returns and controls
the corporation, the corporation will behave as if it has diminishing returns. See also JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF
INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 42 (1988).
22
The reward also incorporates the cost of research and development.

principal is the government and the agent is an inventor. The agent has private information on
which project yields the greatest surplus. The government incentivizes the agent to choose the
project that is most valuable by giving her a fixed portion of surplus from the project she chooses
(and completes).
To illustrate this point, consider a principal–agent model where the agent may work on either
of two projects, 0 or 1. Due to time constraints, the agent cannot work on both. The cost to the
agent of working on either project is the same, , and her reservation wage is normalized to 0. If
executed, projects have payoffs of

and

, respectively, where takes a value

of 1 or -1 with equal probability. Suppose that both principal and agent know the payoff to
project 0, but only the agent knows the value of before any project is undertaken, that is,

is

common knowledge but the agent has private information on .23 The payoff to the principal is
, where

is an indicator for whether the agent chose project 1 and

is a

wage that may depend on information available to the principal, namely, the value of project 0
and whether the agent works on project 0 or 1. We assume a risk-neutral agent who obtains a
payoff of
if she works on either project and 0, her reservation wage, if she does
not. It is easy to verify that the principal’s optimal strategy is to sell the choice between projects
(as well as the return to the projects) to the agent for a cost of and the agent will accept
because

. This equilibrium also coincides with the first best because the agent is

risk neutral.24 For our purposes, the result shows that when the agent has private information on
the value of projects, she should be incentivized to choose the right one by giving a wage equal
to payoff from the projects, even if the cost of research and development are the same for both
projects.25
B. PATENTABILITY STANDARDS, PATENT APPLICATIONS, AND PATENT CHALLENGES

23

The principal may not know the payoff to project 1 either because the payoff goes to some other third party the
principal cares about or because it is realized well after a wage must be paid to the agent.
24
If the agent is risk averse and the principal did not observe , it would still be the optimal strategy for the principal
to offer to sell the choice and payoffs to the agent for . However, because the agent suffers a utility loss from the
random variable , this strategy is not first best. The principal will not sell for less than to provide the agent with
some compensating insurance because the principal would do better by simply offering the agent a small positive
wage (lower than the contemplated price discount) to work on project 0 and no wage to work on project 1.
25

If the agent were risk averse and the principal received a noisy but informative signal about , the optimal contract

would be proportional to (monotonic in) the signal, and thus to , which proxies for social surplus. There is no a
priori reason why the contract would be concave or convex in that signal.
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The above rationale for the patent system assumes, first, that innovations do not occur
without rewards and, second, that patents end up in the hands of people who develop
innovations. Neither assumption is appropriate in all cases. Some innovations emerge without
explicit rewards, or at least without rewards from the government.26 Prominent examples include
academic medical research,27 freeware software, 28 and fashion innovations.29 Moreover, parties
who have developed an innovation may not be able to demonstrate that they did so and parties
who did not develop an innovation have an incentive to claim they did to obtain market power. If
parties innovate in the midst of competition, they may accidentally release the innovation in the
public domain before filing the paperwork required to secure patent rights over the innovation.30
On the flip side, there are frequent complaints about “patent trolls” or “non-practicing entities”
(NPEs) who either patent ideas that require little research or purchase patents based on others’
research, then do not make any risky investment to develop those patented ideas.31 Instead,
critics contend, an NPE waits until some other party takes the expense and risk to commercialize
these ideas and, if the other party is successful, files an infringement suit to extract a portion of
the latter’s profits.32
26

See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Ziv Shafir, Who Chooses Open-Source Software?, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 139 (2011)
(describing the intersection of academic research and open source software); Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft:
Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital Age, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1504–07 (1997) (discussing the history
of freeware and its philosophical opposition to traditional intellectual property rights).
27
Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, American Medical Association, Ethical Issues in the Patenting of Medical
Procedures, 53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 341, 349 (1998) (rejecting “the argument that the patenting of medical processes
is necessary to enable and promote [medical] procedural advances” and arguing that decades of medical
advancement occurred “despite the absence of medical process patents”); Wendy W. Yang, Note, Patent Policy and
Medical Procedure Patents: The Case for Statutory Exclusion from Patentability, 1 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 5 par. 17
(1995) (arguing that the inherent incentives of the scientific community can supplant “economic incentive[s]
provided by patent monopolies”).
28
See Heffan, supra note 26, at 1504–07.
29
Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual Property in Fashion
Design, 92 VA. L. REV. 1687, 1689 (2006).
30
See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (patent is invalid if the invention was published or in public use
more than one year before the patent application was filed). In March 2012, the provisions of the America Invents
Act amending § 102 section come into effect, generally replacing the one-year provision with a bar of public
disclosure or use at any time before the patent’s effective filing date, subject to certain exceptions. See Pub. L. No.
112-29, §3(b)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 285 (2011).
In the pharmaceutical industry, the problem of innovators being unable to secure patent rights is particularly acute.
Pharmaceutical development involves both discovery of a molecule and demonstration that it is effective at treating
humans in clinical trial. Patents are granted, however, after discovery and before the trials. Moreover, a single
molecule may have multiple medical applications, not all evident when the molecule was discovery. If the idea for a
particular application lags substantially behind the discovery, the molecule may enter the public domain (become
generic) before the particular application is demonstrated. In other words, the innovative but belated application
cannot be protected by patent rights. Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87
TEX. L. REV. 503, 519–21 (2009).
31
See, e.g., John R. Allison et. al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677,
691–95 (2011) (detailing the practices of “patent trolls” and their litigation habits).
32
See Walter O. Alomar-Jiménez, Harmonizing Ebay, 1 U. P.R. BUS. L.J. 17, 24 (2010) (explaining that the modus
operandis of patent trolls is “not invest[ing] in research and development (R&D) to create their inventions,”
purchasing patents “cheaply,” monitoring the “technology field of his acquired patents,” suing “defendantinfringer[s],” and “demanding a licensing fee”); Christopher A. Harkins, Fending Off Paper Patents and Patent
Trolls: A Novel “Cold Fusion” Defense Because Changing Times Demand It, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 407, 407
(2007) (“Instead of commercializing products, patent trolls buy up patents (oftentimes older paper patents), wait for

A well-functioning patent system must have a way to ensure that patents are not granted
when they are either unnecessary or undeserved. The U.S. patent system, like many others
around the world,33 solves these problems in two complementary ways. First, it sets up criteria to
judge when an innovation deserves a patent. Specifically, the creation must be novel, nonobvious, and have some utility.34 These doctrines, particularly the requirements of novelty and
non-obviousness,35 are meant to determine whether an invention has actually contributed any
new knowledge to the world.36 The patent system then relies upon inventors’ incentives in the
marketplace to ensure that the invention is socially valuable. If the invention has no value, there
will be no market for it and no reason to invest resources in creating it in the first place. If the
invention is valuable and non-obvious, then the inventor has presumably contributed some
valuable knowledge, and with it some social surplus. Patent law’s doctrines thus provide
reasonable standards for judging when a patent is unnecessary or undeserved—at least when they
function correctly.37
Second, the patent system applies these criteria at two different points during the lifecycle of
an innovation.38 Before a product is commercialized,39 an inventor may apply for a patent with
the technology and industry to grow up around the patent, and then use the patent as a holdup device for extorting
money from would-be defendants wishing to avoid the exorbitant costs of defending against an overreaching
broadly claimed invention.”).
33
For a description of the European patent system, see generally Patrick Coyle, Note, Uniform Patent Litigation in
the European Union: An Analysis of the Viability of Recent Proposals Aimed at Unifying the European Patent
Litigation System, 11 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 171 (2012). For comparisons of the United States, European,
and Japanese patent systems, see generally John R. Thomas, Litigation Beyond the Technological Frontier:
Comparative Approaches to Multinational Patent Enforcement, 27 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 277, 282–88 (1996).
34
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101 & 103 (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
35
Utility only plays a meaningful role at the patent-granting stage for biotechnology and chemistry patents. See Dan
L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1644–46 (2003) (“In the last several
decades . . . the utility requirement has lost much of its force. . . .The only exceptions are biology and chemistry.”).
Even then, it mainly serves to prevent a firm from patenting a compound (or genetic sequence) at too early a stage.
The judgment is that it would be a mistake to allow one firm to lock up a compound before they have any real use
for it, removing it from the public domain as a subject for study. But even here the utility hurdle is not all that high.
Demonstrated in vitro effects are enough to overcome it. In vivo effects on mice are also enough. See also In re
Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1562–63 (Fed. Cir. 1995). (“Even chemical similarity to other effective compounds is enough
36
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting Congress the power to “promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and
discoveries”).
37
Of course some scholars question whether the standards for patentability perfectly correlate with the necessity and
deservedness of patents. We addressed this point in note 7, supra.
38
See Andres Sawicki, Better Mistakes in Patent Law, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 746–49 (2012).
39
Inventors file patent applications prior to commercialization for two basic reasons. First, once a product is
commercialized, the PTO might find that it is no longer novel. See Richard H. Stern, The Bundle of Rights Suited to
New Technology, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 1229, 1249 (1986) (“The subject matter of a patent must be novel, [that is] . . .
not disclosed in any prior publication or commercial product . . . .”). Thus commercialization may preclude a
successful patent application. Noel Courage, Sharing the (Genetic) Wealth, 35 TEX. INT’L L.J. 123, 123–24 (2000)
(reviewing KRISHNA R. DRONAMRAJU, BIOLOGICAL AND SOCIAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY SHARING (1998))
(“[S]cientifically novel inventions are not patentable [when] . . . the invention was publicly disclosed prior to filing a
patent application. Inventions lacking legal novelty are barred from patent protection . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
Second, without a patent, the inventor will face competition during the commercialization process. This may reduce
the returns to commercialization. See Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1648 (2011) (“A patent on a nascent technology . . . can give the patentee ‘an
incentive to make investments to maximize the value of the patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will
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the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO). The office has been criticized, however, for granting too
many patent applications.40 One reason is limited resources. The PTO’s review is relatively
cursory because it receives a very large number of applications but is short-staffed.41 In addition,
the PTO only has the information provided by the patent applicant and whatever limited
information the patent examiner is able to discover on her own.42 Another reason is poor
incentives. PTO examiners lack the incentives to conduct extensive searches for prior art, and
their searches are notoriously less complete and successful than the searches performed by
opposing parties in the course of litigation.43
Moreover, the PTO has a stronger incentive to accept applications than reject them. If the
agency accepts the patent application, it is unlikely any party will directly complain about the
PTO’s decision. The work typically has not been marketed and competitors have not emerged.
By the time a competitor does emerge, the validity of the patent will have shifted from the
jurisdiction of the PTO to that of the federal courts (typically the Federal Circuit), where the
matter will likely arise as an infringement action against the competitor. However, if the patent
application is rejected, the applicant has an incentive immediately to appeal the PTO’s decision.
The PTO, seeking to avoid the cost of appeals and the shame of reversal, errs on the side of
granting applications.44
Patentability criteria (novelty, value, non-obviousness) may be applied a second time after
the patent has been granted. A typical case is where a competitor emerges with a product similar
to that described in a patent and the patent holder files a lawsuit alleging patent infringement. In
order for a patent to have value when asserted against a competitor, it must of course be both
valid and infringed. Therefore, as a defense, the competitor may assert that the plaintiff’s patent
is, in fact, invalid.45 If the court agrees, the plaintiff’s patent is effectively revoked. This is the
produce unpatentable information appropriable by competitors’ . . . .” (quoting Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and
Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 276 (1977)); F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property
Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 709–10 (2001) (describing the effects of competition
in the commercialization process and noting the additional costs borne by the innovating party due to competition).
40
See supra note 10. However, it is possibly that this lax screening is socially optimal. See infra Part III; see also
Lemley, supra note 10, at 1495 n.1.
41
Lemley, supra note 10, at 1499–1500.
42
Id. at 1500.
43
Merges, supra note 10, at 603 (describing patent examiner incentives); Kristen Dietly, Note, Lightening the Load:
Whether the Burden of Proof for Overcoming A Patent’s Presumption of Validity Should Be Lowered, 78 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2615, 2655–56 (2010) (discussing the weaknesses of PTO examinations and arguing against the
presumption of deference to the PTO).
44
Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470, 474 (2011).
45
As we will reiterate below, we need not define a patent challenge to require an assertion that a patent is invalid.
When an infringement suit is filed, the alleged infringer will simultaneously assert that the patent is invalid and, if
valid, not infringed. A patent challenge can equally take the form of an argument that the competing product does
not infringe the patent. A finding of non-infringement, however, may not always be as damaging to patent holders as
a finding of invalidity. After all, the patent holder can always assert the patent against some other party. But in many
cases the two have the same functional effect and the same stakes. For instance, “patent trolls” often sue multiple
defendants—any firm that might be infringing their patents—simultaneously. Matthew Fawcett & Jeremiah Chan,
March of the Trolls: Footsteps Getting Louder, 13 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 1, 18–19 (2008); but see 35 U.S.C. § 299
(2006 & Supp. V 2011) (curbing this practice for lawsuits adjudicated after the passage of the America Invents Act).
Part of the reason patent holders bring suit against every conceivable infringer simultaneously is that sequential
lawsuits raise the probability of the patent being invalidated in one suit and thus rendered unusable in future
lawsuits. In such a suit, a general finding of non-infringement has the same effect as a finding of invalidity. In
addition, a court’s interpretation of a patent’s claims is often simultaneously determinative of both validity and

canonical example of what we call a “patent challenge” by a private party, in this case a
competitor.46
This is not the only way a patent challenge can play out. A firm that wishes to challenge a
patent can pursue a number of different options, including filing a declaratory judgment action
before getting sued for infringement. Alternatively, in the pharmaceutical sector, the challenging
firm need not even market a product in order to infringe on a patent. All that is required is the
filing of an Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) to obtain Food and Drug
Administration approval to market a generic version of a previously approved “branded” drug.
Under the Hatch–Waxman Act, the application alone constitutes grounds for the maker of the
branded drug to assert a patent infringement claim.47
The primary rationale for revisiting a patent grant in this manner is that, for the reasons
described above, the PTO grants many patents that are either unnecessary or undeserved. This
rationale does not, however, explain why the PTO delegates the authority to trigger a patent
challenge to private parties rather than simply revisiting its own decision after some time.48 In
some sense the delegation is consistent with the move by the patent system to decentralize the
decision of innovations by allowing inventors to apply for patents rather than offering rewards
for innovations chosen by the government. But decentralization by itself is not a virtue.
A better justification is that allowing another private party to challenge a patent addresses the
ex parte nature of the PTO approval process.49 Private parties often have better information about
which patents are invalid and stronger incentives to search for relevant information and litigate
vigorously. Accordingly, a patent challenge is typically brought by a private party that wishes to
market a good similar to that described in the patent. Such a party will only exist if the patented
work has positive economic value and will litigate only if the patent imposes an economic cost
on them. This reduces the risk that court resources will be wasted on screening zero-cost patents.

infringement. The two doctrines thus function frequently as substitutes: if the court interprets the claims broadly, the
patent is invalid, and if it interprets them narrowly the patent is not infringed. Accordingly, we will treat these two
doctrines largely as substitutes for purposes of the discussion that follows.
46
We hasten to add that we mean no normative judgment in describing these suits as “challenges.” Firms assert a
great number of invalid patents every year; they also very commonly attempt to interpret their own patents overly
broadly in order to capture as much productive economic conduct as possible. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley,
Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1765–70 (2009); Ian
Lampl, Establishing Rules for Resolving Markman Failures, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1025, 1038–39 (2005). In these
instances, patent challenges are highly socially valuable.
47
35 U.S.C. §271(e)(2) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). Under the Hatch–Waxman Act, the generic drug maker must
demonstrate that its drug is bioequivalent to the branded drug and certify that it does not infringe on the branded
drug’s patent before it can obtain the approval of the Food and Drug Administration to market its product through
the ANDA process. As a reward for encouraging generic drug entry, the statute gives the first generic maker to file
for entry into a market 180 days during which it exclusively may compete against the branded drug. This incentive
encourages generic companies to file for entry before the branded drug’s patent naturally expires (twenty years after
it is granted). Once the generic files an ANDA, the branded company has forty-five days to file an infringement suit.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B) (2006); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a
Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1560–61 (2006) (summarizing generic entry under Hatch–
Waxman).
48
The PTO could also restrict its review to patents with positive economic value by only reviewing patents that pay
their maintenance fee. See 35 U.S.C. § 41(b) & (c) (2006). If a patent has zero value, it is unlikely that the holder
will pay the maintenance fee.
49
For a discussion of the ex parte nature of patent examination, see Lemley, supra note 10, at 1524–25.
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These arguments are similar to the theoretical arguments given for case-or-controversy and
standing requirements that define who may litigate cases generally.50
II. THE FLAWS OF PATENT CHALLENGES
Although patent challenges may be necessary to weed out some invalid patents, they have
two important flaws. First, they sometimes result in valid patents being invalidated (“false
negatives”), thereby discouraging innovation. Second, they sometimes fail against even invalid
patents (“false positives”), thereby allowing such patents to continue imposing costs on
innovators and consumers. We address these false negative and false positive problems in turn.
We pause to note that here and elsewhere, we use the words “valid” and “invalid” to mean
“valid and infringed” and “invalid or not infringed,” respectively. Both infringement and validity
are, of course, necessary requirements before a patent holder is entitled to damages or a licensing
fee. We describe these patents as valid and invalid largely as a matter of shorthand, but also to
highlight the importance of the validity decision to the value of the patent and the rights of the
patent owner going forward. A judgment of non-infringement may frustrate a patent owner in a
single case but the patent might still be worthwhile against other infringers, whereas a judgment
of invalidity ends the patent’s useful life.51 Likewise, a patent challenger who obtains a judgment
of non-infringement may or may not aid other potential challengers, while one who succeeds in
invalidating a patent has provided a public good that advantages similarly situated parties.
A. CHALLENGES AGAINST VALID PATENTS

When the owners of valid patents are forced into court, the consequences can be severe. At
minimum, such parties will be forced to pay litigation costs to defend against validity challenges.
More significantly, federal courts may mistakenly invalidate truly valid patents. Not only are the
costs of litigation and the risks of improper invalidation significant, they can also exert a
differential impact on some of the most important and vulnerable patent holders. First, patent
challengers tend to target the most profitable patents, imposing costs disproportionately on the
most socially valuable innovations. Second, patent challengers also tend to target the smallest
patent holders to maximize their chance of victory. These tendencies diminish the fraction of
social surplus from an innovation that the patent holder captures, especially for the most valuable
innovations and the smallest innovators. This outcome is inconsistent with the basic premise of
the patent system, which is designed to allow inventors to capture a greater percentage of the
profits from their inventions as a means of inducing innovation. It thus tends to undermine the
value of the system.
1. Mistaken Challenges and Invalidation
50

See Christian B. Sundquist, The First Principles of Standing: Privilege, System Justification, and the Predictable
Incoherence of Article III, 1 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 119, 131 (2011) (“One classic defense of standing doctrine relies
on the . . . argument that the standing requirements are necessary to ensure that the judicial process is controlled by
plaintiffs with a sufficient stake in the litigation.”).
51
See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (holding that once a court has
declared a patent invalid, the patent holder is estopped from asserting that the patent is valid as against parties not
involved in the original lawsuit).

Delegation of patent challenges to private parties has some benefits: better knowledge about
the costs of bad patents, better incentives to produce information on patents, and economizing on
court resources. But even well-intentioned private parties are not perfect. They may accidentally
challenge patent holders that have truly valid patents. A rough indicator of this—if one assumes
that courts make no errors—is that courts validate roughly 55% of patents that are challenged.52
On its face this suggests that the holders of over half of challenged patents must pay litigation
costs even though the patents are valid, eating into the deserved payoff.53
Of course, courts may accidentally validate truly invalid patents, implying that the 55%
validation rate is an overestimate of the errors that challengers make when initiating suit. But, by
the same token, courts may accidentally invalidate truly valid patents, suggesting that the 45%
invalidation rate may include cases where valid patent holders were both incorrectly targeted by
challengers and were incorrectly found to hold invalid patents by courts.54 These valid patent
holders do not simply pay litigation costs; they also lose all future value from their patents. Thus,
incorrect court decisions impose even larger costs than correct court decisions from the
perspective of valid patent holders.
Why do we suspect that courts might mistakenly invalidate patents when the popular
sentiment in recent scholarship is to bemoan the patent system’s lax standards for patenting?55
Many of the arguments for why courts may accidentally validate invalid patents are also
arguments for why they might invalidate valid patents.56 For example, several scholars criticize
the Federal Circuit, which handles the bulk of appeals in patent litigation cases, for promulgating
weak standards for patentability.57 Others have noted the wide variation in validation rates across
industries,58 circuits,59 and, within jurisdictions, by whether cases are tried to the bench or to a
52

John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185,
205 (1998). At the same time, only 25% of patents in lawsuits are found valid and infringed, which indicates that a
somewhat higher percentage of patent challenges have merit. Mark A. Lemley, The Fractioning of Patent Law, in
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAW (Shyamkrishna Balganesh, ed., forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at
2–3), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1895681.
53
The low number of patent trials (roughly one hundred per year) may mask a high number of valid patents that paid
a cost due to challengers’ targeting errors. See Lemley, supra note 10, at 1501. Approximately 85% of all patent
cases settle before trial. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 271 (2006).
54
If courts made no mistakes and patent challengers had perfect foresight, no holder of a valid patent would ever be
sued. We can reject this scenario, however, because it cannot explain why 55% of patents are validated.
55
See supra note 10.
56
Another reason is that patent law’s standards for judging whether innovations deserve patents—novelty, nonobviousness, patentability—and the doctrines that complement them may not be the best correlates of whether a
patent is necessary to obtain an innovation and whether that innovation has positive social value. See our caveat in
note 7, supra.
57
See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and
Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62–69 (2000) (criticizing the formulation
of the written description requirement); R. Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An
Empirical Assessment of Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1111–12 (2004) (finding that the Federal
Circuit has been only mildly successful in promulgating a coherent and predictable doctrine of claim construction);
David O. Taylor, Clear but Unconvincing: The Federal Circuit’s Invalidity Standard, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 293, 295–96 (2011).
58
Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 221–23 (finding variation in validation rates across industries). Incidentally,
litigation rates also vary by industry. John R. Allison et al., Valuable Patents, 92 GEO. L.J. 435, 477–78 (2003).
59
Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 192 (citing Gloria K. Koenig, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL AND
SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS (rev. ed. 1980)).
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jury.60 This may reflect not just randomness in litigation but variation in underlying patentability
standards.61 Most concerning may be that prior appellate reversals and job tenure do not improve
the performance of district courts judges in patent cases as measured by subsequent appellate
reversals.62 Thus, judges do not appear to learn how to better apply the law. Each of these flaws
could translate to mistakes with either invalid or valid patents.
Whatever the cause, imposing the risk of litigation and mistaken invalidation on valid patents
reduces the fraction of social surplus that an inventor obtains through a patent. This results in a
weakening of the incentive the patent system employs to get inventors to work on the most
socially valuable patents.63
2. Disproportionate Impacts on the Most Valuable Patents
One of the theoretical benefits of delegating patent challenges is that it economizes on court
resources. A challenger should not challenge a patent with zero economic value because the
market opened by the challenge is unlikely to have value to the challenger and litigation has
positive costs. Unless litigation costs are positive but very small, however, this economizing can
go too far. If litigation has high marginal costs or large fixed costs, patent challengers will only
go after patents that are sufficiently profitable to cover their litigation costs. If it costs $10
million for a firm to pursue a patent challenge,64 then its profits after successful litigation have to
be at least $10 million to warrant the challenge. Because profits after the introduction of a
competitor are lower than profits under a monopoly, the patent holder (which had a monopoly)
must lose more than $10 million in payoff from the patent.
The problem is compounded if there are fewer competitors in a position to challenge a patent
holder than there are patents. In that case, the challengers, if behaving optimally, will go after the
most valuable patents, not just the patents that—once invalidated—offer a payoff sufficient to
cover the cost of litigation. To illustrate, suppose that there are two patents that could be
challenged, one that provides $30 million in profits for its patent holder and the other that
provides $60 million in profits to its patent holder, but only one firm that has the ability to
challenge these two patents. Suppose also that market-wide profits after entry of a competitor are
two-thirds the previous profits of the patent holder. This implies that successfully challenging the

60

Id. at 212 (finding that juries are more likely to validate patents).
Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1185 (2002)
(suggesting the non-obviousness standard might be stated in a manner that is harder for software patents to meet
than for biotech patents to meet).
62
Schwartz, supra note 11, at 258–59 (finding neither evidence that district court judges learn from prior appeals of
their rulings nor a significant relationship between judicial experience and performance). Of course, it is possible
that appellate review in the Federal Circuit is effectively random.
63
But see Sawicki, supra note 38, at 766 (citing Jonathan M. Barnett, Private Protection of Patentable Goods, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 1251, 1251–52 (2004)) (noting that the disincentive effects of mistaken invalidations depends on
the efficacy of non-patent mechanisms—such as trade secrets—that inventors can use to appropriate the social
surplus from their inventions).
64
This is not an atypical expenditure. See Allison & Lemley, supra note 52, at 187 (suggesting that $1 million is a
low estimate of litigation costs); see also Josh Lerner, Patenting in the Shadow of Competitors, 38 J. L. & ECON.
463, 470–71 (1995) (reviewing evidence that, while $3.7 billion was spent on basic research in 1991, $1 billion was
spent on direct litigation costs, and that indirect costs of patent litigation for public firms averaged $20 million per
case).
61

$30 million patent yields revenue of $10 million65 for the challenger and challenging the $60
million patent yields the challenger $20 million.66 If the challenger can only challenge one of
these patents, it will choose the higher valued patent. Thus the holder of the higher value patent
will face greater litigation risks than the holder of the lower value patent.
Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that challengers target the most valuable patents.
For example, generic drug companies tend to infringe on patents that protect markets with the
highest sales revenues.67 As a result, blockbuster drugs have experienced significant reductions
in their effective patent life in recent years.68 Whereas the median loss to a drug patent holder
from a successful challenge is roughly $400 million,69 the average loss to such a firm is roughly
$1 billion in firm value. This indicates a strong rightward skew in losses. We can think of no
reason why patterns of litigation would differ in other industries.70
The result is that delegating challenges to private parties not only reduces the share of social
surplus that patent holders appropriate from their innovation but also reduces that share
disproportionately for the highest value patents. In other words, the nature of private challenges
is such that it disincentivizes the most valuable innovations the most, directly undermining the
justification for employing the patent system over one that employs government rewards.
3. Disproportionate Impacts on Smaller Firms
Challenges also disproportionately discourage innovations by smaller firms. Commercially
successful firms are not the only entities that obtain and hold valuable patents, and thus they are
not the only ones to become targets when they innovate productively. Smaller firms—startup
companies and the like—also frequently see their valuable patents attacked, and because the
firms are less well-equipped to defend themselves the attacks can be all the more pernicious.
These assaults take two typical forms. First, rather than license or purchase valuable IP from
smaller entities, large firms often simply attempt to engineer around it.71 For instance, imagine
that Small Startup has designed a valuable new semiconductor chip. It does not possess the
necessary manufacturing capability to actually produce the chip, but it hopes to license the
technology to a firm such as Intel. If Intel believes that Small Startup’s patent is weak, or that
Small Startup will not have the resources to successfully prosecute a suit for patent infringement,
65

30 × (2/3) × (1/2) = 10. The one-half is because we assume that the two firms split any profits equally.
60 × (2/3) × (1/2) = 20.
67
C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Evergreening, Patent Challenges, and Effective Market Life in
Pharmaceuticals, 31 J. HEALTH ECON. 327, 336 (2012); Laura E. Panattoni, The Effect of Paragraph IV Decisions
and Generic Entry Before Patent Expiration on Brand Pharmaceutical Firms, 30 J. HEALTH ECON. 126 (2011).
68
Henry G. Grabowski & Margaret Kyle, Generic Competition and Market Exclusivity Periods in Pharmaceuticals,
28 MANAGERIAL DECISION ECON. 491, 497 (2007). Although Hemphill and Sampat, supra note 67, at 3–4, claim
this is because blockbuster drugs use lower quality patents to extend their patent life (so called “evergreening”
strategies), their argument fails to explain why Grabowski and Kyle find that the total market exclusivity period for
higher-sale new-molecular entities (NME) is lower, whether measured by mean or median, than that for lower sale
NMEs.
69
Indeed, this value is larger than the average cost of R&D up to the point of market approval. Joseph A. DiMasi et
al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 154 fig. 1 (2003).
70
Indeed, challenging a patent may be easier in the drug industry than in other industries because the Hatch–
Waxman Act gives the first generic firm to file an ANDA 180 days of market exclusivity against other generic
entry. See supra note 47.
71
John M. Golden, Principles for Patent Remedies, 88 TEX. L. REV. 505, 544 (2010).
66
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Intel could elect to engineer around the patent rather than licensing it. It could simply begin
manufacturing a very similar technology with only minor, cosmetic alterations, gambling that it
will be able to convince a court that it has not infringed. The more that firms like Small Startup
fear this outcome, the less incentive they will have to innovate and enter markets occupied by
large incumbents in the first place.
This is not to say that all instances of engineering around a patent are cases in which the
patent holder is not receiving a fair return on its invention; to the contrary, many patent holders
deserve only narrow patents that are relatively easy to design around. However, there are many
instances in which a small firm has in fact introduced a new and useful innovation that a larger
entity intends to copy. In these cases, a poorly drafted patent, or simply the application of
significant litigation resources,72 can allow the larger firm to avoid paying for the technology it is
borrowing.73
This possibility is exacerbated by the resource differential between the two entities. If the fair
market value for a startup’s patent (or portfolio of patents) is in the tens or even hundreds of
millions of dollars, a larger firm might think nothing of spending a few million dollars to defeat
it or engineer around it.74 In theory, the startup should be able to use its patent to obtain the
capital necessary to defend the patent. In practice, however, that is often impossible—capital
constraints can make a battle with a larger firm very difficult for a startup to win.75 And if a large
company can pay its engineers $3 million to find a way around a patent it would otherwise
license for $10 million, it will often do so. The patent is still worth something—the large firm is
paying millions to evade it—but the startup is not capturing any of that value.
This is not to say that designing around a patent is always or necessarily a bad thing. Ideally,
patents would possess clear boundaries.76 A great deal of scholarship has been devoted to the
virtues of narrow patents that do not claim excessively broad inventive scopes.77 The point is not
that every patent holder should be entitled to capture rents from a wide swath of following
inventions. Rather, we have in mind situations in which a firm is only trying to patent the
invention it has already created, but its patent leaves open the possibility that a competitor will
find some way to circumvent the intellectual property right. The competitor is still borrowing the
key idea—the “point of novelty”78—but has managed to evade the patent. When large firms
72

Michael J. Meurer, Inventors, Entrepreneurs, and Intellectual Property Law, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1201, 1227 (2008)
(“Anticompetitive IP lawsuits may succeed because the small firm defendant lacks the information to prove
noninfringement or invalidity. Other defendants may settle to avoid litigation costs even though they are confident
the plaintiff would lose the lawsuit.”).
73
Stuart J.H. Graham & Ted Sichelman, Why Do Start-Ups Patent?, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1063, 1086 (2008)
(“The rational would-be infringer, when confronted with a patent held by an individual inventor or a small company
with limited resources, would likely be more willing to engage in infringing behavior, calculating that the risk of
enforcement is lower.”).
74
See Golden, supra note 71, at 544 (describing the incentives to design around patents rather than license them).
75
Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A Legal and
Business Decision, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 371, 405 (2002) (“Additionally, even if adequate funds
exist to obtain patent protection sufficient capital must exist to enforce patent rights against infringers. . . . This
enables accused infringers to aggressively exploit the limited funds available to a patent owner.”).
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Tun-Jen Chiang, Fixing Patent Boundaries, 108 MICH. L. REV. 523, 560 (2010).
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See, e.g., Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A New
Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1955 (2005) (arguing that broad patents may be used
for anticompetitive behavior).
78
See Mark A. Lemley, Essay, Point of Novelty, 105 N.W. U. L. REV (2011).

adopt this approach in lieu of purchasing or licensing the patent, it diminishes the incentives for
startups to innovate in the first instance.
The second type of assault on small firms with valuable patents is more direct. In many
cases, larger firms will threaten to sue small startups with their own (large) patent portfolios as a
means of forcing the startup to license its IP on favorable terms.79 Imagine two firms operating in
the same market: a large firm L and a small startup S. Suppose S invents and patents a new,
valuable device that will compete with L’s products. If L has a large patent portfolio, it can
threaten to sue S for infringement even if S’s new device would not actually infringe L’s patents.
The very threat of suit—not to mention actual scorched-earth litigation—can be enough to
hamper S’s ability to attract investors and bring its product to market; venture capitalists and
banks will be wary of investing in a firm with the threat of litigation hanging over its head.80
Accordingly, L can force S to license its patent to L on favorable terms in exchange for crosslicenses to L’s patents (which S does not necessarily need). L then becomes S’s competitor,
despite S’s original patent. This practice has become known as “patent bullying,”81 and it can
diminish the value of innovations made by small startups (to those startups) if they do not have
the resources or the patent portfolios to defend themselves.
These two practices—engineering around and patent bullying—bend the reward curve
downward for small firms that successfully innovate. And as with the mechanisms we described
in section II.A.2, the more valuable a firm’s innovation, the more pronounced this effect will be.
More valuable inventions are more valuable targets to competitors; larger firms will be willing to
invest greater resources in engineering around a valuable innovation or threatening the startup
that created it. Worse still, threats by large competitors will scare away capital and commercial
partners from small firms, depriving them the resources they require to fight back on more equal
terms. The result will be a diminution of rewards to small firms for successful innovation below
the socially optimal level, and consequently a reduction in these firms’ innovative efforts.
B. CHALLENGES AGAINST INVALID PATENTS

In some cases, challenges go too far, raising costs on valid patents and discouraging
innovation. In other cases, however, they do not go far enough: the PTO grants an unnecessary
or undeserved patent and a court nonetheless upholds it. In such cases, an invalid patent
continues to generate significant economic costs without the compensating benefit of
encouraging innovation. The failure of private parties to challenge all invalid patents is not a
direct cost of challenges as much as a failure to fully accomplish the institutional objective of
challenges.
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The reasons why patent challenges underperform mirror the reasons why they sometimes go
too far. Either private parties fail to challenge an invalid patent or courts incorrectly uphold such
patents when challenged. Moreover, the failure of private parties can often be attributed to their
inclination to challenge only the most profitable patients, because they offer larger rewards if
successful, or the smallest patent holders, because they are most easily defeated in court. We
address these points in turn.
1. Insufficient Challenges and Validations
Just as private parties lack the complete information required to avoid challenging valid
patents, they also may lack the information required to challenge all invalid patents. It is
difficult, however, to quantify the extent to which private parties fail to challenge invalid patents.
In general, one only observes challenges that are actually filed. Situations in which invalid
patents are not challenged are “censored” to scholars.
The second and more important source of leakage with challenges is that, even if an invalid
patent is challenged, a court might mistakenly validate it. As previously noted, scholars have
criticized the Federal Circuit for weak standards of patentability, courts in general for varying
degrees of fluency with patent cases, and judges for failing to learn from experience.82 The 55%
overall court-validation-rate provides some information on the rate at which courts mistakenly
validate invalid patents. It is likely that this 55% contains at least some truly valid patents;
therefore, this is probably an upper bound on the rate of incorrect validations by courts. In
addition, challengers might settle cases rather than litigating them fully, depriving the public of
the value of the patent challenge. And here, too, there is likely a disproportionate impact on
smaller firms, which are more likely to lack the resources for scorched-earth litigation and thus
more likely to settle earlier.
When an invalid patent is never challenged—or, worse, when it is validated by a court—it
imposes several types of costs on consumers and other firms. First, if the patent is protecting a
commercial good, those goods will continue to be sold at monopoly prices, creating deadweight
losses for consumers who cannot afford them.83 Second, when a court incorrectly finds that an
invalid patent is valid and infringed by another inventor, the second (true) inventor must pay
damages to the holder of the invalid patent. This functions as a tax on genuine innovation, paid
by true innovators to holders of invalid property rights. The result will be a diminution of
incentives to innovate on account of this tax. And third, success with invalid patents will cause
firms to invest money in acquiring, asserting, and litigating those patents. They will hire lawyers,
demand licensing and settlement fees, and litigate at substantial cost.84 If the patents underlying
these activities are invalid and socially worthless, then licensing and litigating them will generate
no social value either—they represent pure rent-seeking. The more that courts err and validate
invalid patents, the more that they will encourage the wasting of resources on these socially
worthless activities.
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2. Disproportionate Impacts
The tendency of patent challenges to target the most profitable patents may exacerbate the
cost of challenges when an underlying patent is truly valid, but it is a positive attribute of
challenges when the underlying patent is truly invalid. The most profitable patents are the ones
that generate the most deadweight loss because monopoly and oligopoly pricing models suggest
that deadweight loss is proportional to monopoly or oligopoly profits.85 If the underlying patent
is invalid, this larger deadweight loss is not offset by a larger incentive to innovate, as it might be
with valid patents.86 Thus, the tendency of challenges to seek out the more profitable invalid
patents implies that costly challenges are being appropriately rationed to patents with the largest
social cost.
The glass-half-empty view, however, is that the propensity to challenge more profitable
patents implies fewer challenges against less profitable patents. Yet even less profitable invalid
patents impose deadweight loss. It would improve social welfare if there were more challenges
and these challenges targeted the less profitable patents, so long as the social costs from those
invalid patents are greater than the cost of litigation against those patents. It is unlikely that all
such challenges are occurring because the gains to a private party from challenging such a patent
may be less than the deadweight loss from that patent. If the patent challenger wins, competitors
other than the challenger may enter the market, lowering profits of the challenger below the level
of the deadweight loss. It is this concern that explains why, for example, the Hatch–Waxman Act
grants the first generic producer to challenge a drug patent 180 days of market exclusivity (as
against other generic producers) if the generic producer prevails in its challenge.87
Finally, a corollary of the claim that challengers focus on the valid patents of smaller firms is
that challengers tend to avoid challenges against invalid patents held by large firms. These large
firms can credibly threaten large litigation costs to discourage challengers and sustain invalid
patents. Large firms can often extract more rent from any given intellectual property right than
smaller firms because, for example, they have greater market share and more information about
consumers.
III. ENHANCED PATENT REMEDIES
In the preceding Parts, we described the manner in which patent challenges can result in what
amount to taxes on valuable innovation or subsidies for the assertion of invalid patents. In
particular, these taxes often fall most heavily upon the innovations that are most valuable and on
smaller firms. We suggested that the inevitable result of such taxes and subsidies will be to
diminish incentives to innovate for the most productive inventors and to encourage rent
extraction by non-innovative firms.
Here, we offer a counterintuitive solution to this problem: raise the stakes of patent lawsuits.
Patent holders who manage to prevail against challengers should receive enhanced rewards—
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heightened damages or extensions of their patent terms—while patent holders who lose at trial
should be penalized for suing on the basis of invalid patents. This approach might seem
misguided on its face. If courts are liable to err in patent lawsuits, the more appropriate response
would seem to be to reduce the impact of those lawsuits. Scholars have suggested such
reforms,88 and in recent years courts appear to have taken steps in this direction.89
Yet as we will demonstrate below, increasing the stakes of patent litigation can have
tremendously beneficial effects on private firms’ incentives. Firms with valid, valuable patents
will realize greater profits on those patents, providing them with additional incentives to innovate
and correcting for the costs imposed by improper patent challenges. Firms with invalid patents
will face steep penalties if they lose at trial. Those penalties will in turn dissuade them from
filing suit in the first place and diminish their ability to extract licensing and settlement fees. The
result will be a patent system that comes closer to rewarding genuine innovators but not the
holders of socially worthless property rights.
A. CANONICAL SOLUTIONS

The problems we have described in the preceding Parts all center around judicial error.90 In
the face of such problems, commentators have typically suggested the most straightforward
solution: invest in accuracy. Proposals for making courts more accurate abound.91 However,
there are well-documented practical and theoretical impediments to this solution. Courts,
particularly courts staffed by generalist judges, will always struggle with highly technical patent
cases.92 The judicial process and the limitations it imposes upon gathering outside information
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and accessing expertise will also impede judicial accuracy.93 This is not to say that there is no
value to investing in greater judicial accuracy; such investments may well be worthwhile. But
they are no panacea.
If there are limits to judicial accuracy, perhaps the government could instead invest in
accuracy at the Patent and Trademark Office. The patent literature is rife with calls for improving
accuracy at the PTO and suggestions for achieving that goal.94 However, even if this were
possible, it would not eliminate the costs involved with patent challenges. Holders of valuable,
valid patents might still bear costs as those patents were challenged in court. The necessary
second step would be to eliminate post-grant validity challenges entirely, whether in federal
court, before the PTO, or elsewhere. Once a patent had been issued by the PTO, it would be
considered per se valid and not subject to question in any future proceeding. The elimination of
post-grant challenges could be coupled with enhanced review at the PTO, with additional
resources devoted to screening out invalid patents before they were ever issued. In theory, then,
the costs of patent challenges would be borne most heavily by parties with questionable or
invalid patents, not successful innovators.
Yet there are serious problems with this option. The first is that the examination performed
by the PTO may never be terribly efficient or effective at weeding out bad patents because PTO
examiners have misaligned incentives.95 As we explained above, they have no incentive to
conduct thorough searches of prior art and, even if they did, they would still have greater
incentives to grant, rather than reject, patent applications.96 Moreover, even if it were possible to
correct these incentive problems, it would be tremendously costly to conduct a thorough search
of the prior art on each and every patent filed each year.97 There are simply too many patent
applications, and too many of them are economically insignificant and will never be litigated or
licensed.98 As inefficient as patent challenges may be, conducting a full-scale examination of
every patent would be even worse. Lastly, in many cases the owners of valuable patents are
frustrated not by rulings that their patents are invalid, but instead by rulings that they are not
infringed by important competitors.99 Banning challenges to a patent’s validity could hardly
solve this problem, and there is no correlative solution to the problems caused by noninfringement. Most importantly, if the patent system is generally functioning correctly, it makes
little sense to entirely prohibit a set of challenges which will be welfare-enhancing more often
than not. Such a remedy is overbroad.
93
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A more moderate alternative would be to imbue patents that have been granted by the PTO
with a heavy presumption of validity, diminishing the number of incorrect invalidity
determinations in the federal courts. Patents are currently presumed valid when granted, and
clear-and-convincing evidence is required before they can be found invalid.100 This presumption
might be strengthened further, to the point where (for instance) a patent could only be invalidated
if no reasonable person could find it valid. Some scholars have suggested that the law should
move in the opposite direction, toward eliminating the presumption of validity on the basis of the
PTO’s manifest failings in patent examination,101 but change now appears very unlikely as the
Supreme Court recently affirmed the existing standard.102 Heightening the standard for invalidity
would have many of the same advantages and flaws as simply eliminating challenges entirely,
though those effects would be more muted. Absent any reason to believe that such an
intermediate solution would decrease the costs of eliminating validity challenges more than it
would the benefits, it strikes us as no more advisable than a complete ban.
B. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: ENHANCED REWARDS AND PENALTIES

The issue that we have identified is partly the result of erroneous decisions to challenge or
not to challenge a patent, and erroneous judicial decisions to uphold an invalid patent or strike
down a valid patent. If we cannot easily reduce the probability that a valuable patent will be
erroneously defeated at trial, the second-best alternative might be to increase the rewards to
holders of valuable patents who prevail at trial. So long as courts are more likely than not to
uphold a valid patent, the effect would be the same: to increase the valid patent holder’s net
expected trial outcome. Similarly, if we cannot easily reduce the probability that an invalid
patent will be erroneously validated at trial, the second-best alternative might be to impose
additional penalties against the holders of patents who fail at trial. So long as courts are more
likely than not to strike down an invalid patent, this would reduce the invalid patent holder’s net
expected trial outcome.
We thus suggest raising the stakes in patent cases. Our basic idea is simple. If a patent holder
sues and wins, the court should award enhanced damages above and beyond the normal measure
of damages. If a patent holder sues and loses, the court should assess a substantial monetary
penalty against the patent holder. This may seem counterintuitive—if patent lawsuits are not
perfectly accurate, it would seem to make little sense to increase the costs involved in errors. Yet
so long as courts are better than a coin flip at identifying a patent as valid or invalid, a system of
properly designed, supplemental rewards and penalties could simultaneously (1) eliminate the
downward pressure on innovative incentives caused by errors within the patent system; and (2)
dissuade holders of bad patents from filing suit in the first instance. Most importantly, such a
system would tend to benefit holders of valid, valuable patents, and diminish incentives to
acquire and assert invalid patents.
How would such a system function? Our idea is to apply standard theories of compensation
drawn from tort law.103 Consider first holders of valid, valuable patents. The purpose behind
100

35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
See Lichtman &. Lemley, supra note 10.
102
Microsoft Corp., 131 S. Ct. at 2243, 2252.
103
See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 167–214 (7th ed. 2007) (describing standard economic
theories of tort law).
101

enhanced rewards is to compensate those owners for the risk that their patents will be improperly
invalidated and thus counteract the downward bending of the reward curve for the most valuable
inventions. What is the cost of that risk? Suppose that a typical valid, valuable patent has a
probability of being erroneously invalidated (or erroneously found not infringed) in litigation.
Suppose further that litigation imposes a fixed cost of on the patent holder. The cost of
litigation to a patent holder is
and

, where

is the value of the patent (to its owner) per year

is the number of useful years of patent life lost to the patent owner.104 The

term

represents the risk of early invalidation.105
The calculation for losing patent owners is quite similar. Suppose that the owner of an invalid
patent sues a genuine innovator for infringement. Suppose the probability that the court errs and
upholds an invalid patent is , the same as the probability that the court strikes down an valid
patent.106 The accused infringer will bear litigation costs of . It will also face expected damages
of

. The potential cost to the innovator is therefore

. As in tort law, the way to deter

the holder of an invalid patent from imposing such costs on blameless innovators is to force the
losing patent owner to internalize the costs of her own lawsuit, namely
.
A problem that arises is that, just as a court cannot perfectly identify whether a patent is valid
or invalid, it cannot perfectly identify which parties deserve compensation for exposure to
litigation and those which should be penalized for imposing litigation risks. All courts know is
104
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, in order to simplify our

whether they upheld or struck down a patent. Therefore, any compensation or penalties imposed
after patent litigation must be conditioned on verdicts. In doing so, the court must account for the
fact that a patent that is upheld may not be valid and a patent that is struck down may not be
invalid. This implies that the optimal compensation for a patent that has been upheld is

where

is the probability that a patent is valid given that it was upheld by the
is the probability that a patent is actually invalid even though it

court, and

was upheld by the court. That is, the additional compensation provided to a winning patent
holder must be reduced to account for the probability that the court erred and the patent was not
actually valid. Similarly, the optimal penalty for a patent that has been struck down at trial is

where

is the probability that a patent is actually valid even though it

was struck down by the court, and

is the probability that a patent is

invalid given that it was struck down by the court. As with enhanced rewards, because judicial
verdicts are imperfect, the penalty must be reduced to account for the possibility that the court
erred in striking it down.
To calculate the optimal transfers and penalties, we need to estimate how informative court
judgments are. To do this, we can use Bayes’s Theorem:

where
which is equal to

is the probability that a patent will be upheld given that it is valid,
;

given that it is invalid; and

is the probability that a patent will be upheld
and

are the probabilities that a patent

selected at random will be valid or invalid, respectively. If we assume that

,107 then Bayes’s Rule suggests that

simplifies to

. Because a patent must either be valid or invalid, this also implies
that

. Using the same approach, we can estimate the probabilities that a

patent is valid or invalid if it is struck down. By Bayes’s Rule,

where

is the probability that a patent will be struck down given that

it is invalid, which is equal to

;

is the probability that a patent will

be struck down given that it is valid, which is equal to p; and

and

are the

probabilities that a patent selected at random will be valid or invalid, respectively. As before, if
we assume that
,
simplifies to
. Again by negative implication,

.

If we plug these values into the equations for optimal compensation, we will find that the
optimal reward for a patent upheld at trial is

Likewise, the optimal penalty for a patent struck down at trial is

The

discount reflects the lack of confidence that court verdicts identify truly valid and

invalid patents.
In order for this system of enhanced rewards and penalties to have the desired incentive
effects, patent holders and challengers must of course have some sense of whether the patent at
107
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issue is valid and infringed or not. If the parties are entirely mistaken as to the validity of the
patent, enhanced rewards and penalties will only skew their behavior even further. However, as
we will demonstrate at the end of this section, very little accuracy is actually required of patent
holders and challengers. So long as litigants are better than a coin flip at determining what sort of
patent is involved, the system of enhanced rewards and penalties will improve litigation
incentives.
In order to illustrate the effects of these enhanced rewards and penalties, consider a simple
numerical example. Suppose that the typical patent litigation costs $10 million, and the error rate
in the typical case is 20%. (It will of course be impossible to determine the error rate in a
particular case—doing so would be tantamount to determining the outcome with perfect
certainty. Courts will necessarily rely instead upon the typical error rate across cases.)108
Suppose further that pharmaceutical Firm A holds a patent that is worth $10 million per year and
has seven years of patent life remaining. That patent is being infringed by generic drug Firm B.
Firm A stands to collect $70 million (the value of damages and an injunction) from Firm B if it
prevails at trial.109 Under current rules, if Firm A were to prevail, its gain would be:
$70 million in damages – $10 million in litigation costs

$60 million.

If Firm A were defeated, it would pay:
$10 million in litigation costs.
Under our proposed system of enhanced rewards and benefits, if Firm A prevailed, it would
collect:
$70 million in damages – $10 million in litigation costs
$10 million
million 0.2
1 – 0.4 in enhanced rewards $74.4 million.

$70

If Firm A lost at trial, it would be forced to pay:
$10 million in litigation costs
in penalties $24.4 million.

$10 million

$70 million

0.2

1 – 0.4

Now consider the effects that these enhanced rewards and penalties will have upon litigant
behavior. Imagine that Firm A has a valid, valuable patent, one based upon legitimate research
and covering a socially valuable invention. Suppose that Firm A has a 75% chance of prevailing
against Firm B at trial. Under current law, Firm A’s expected payoff from litigating is:
108
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$60 million net

0.75 – $10 million

0.25

$42.5 million.

With enhanced rewards and penalties, Firm A’s expected payoff is:
$74.4 million net

0.75 – $24.4 million

0.25

$49.7 million.

As is evident from the calculations above, the enhanced rewards that Firm A receives when it
succeeds at trial more than balance out the penalties it would be forced to pay if it fails. This is
because Firm A has a strong patent, one that is more likely than not to be found valid and
infringed. The result is that Firm A will be almost fully compensated for the risk it runs that its
patent will be found invalid each time it is forced to litigate. Firm A’s reward curve will be bent
back upward, and its incentives to pursue the most socially valuable inventions will be largely
restored.
Suppose that Firm A instead owns a worthless, invalid patent, one that it should not be
asserting against genuine innovators. Nonetheless, because of the possibility of judicial error,
there is a 20% chance that Firm A’s patent will be found valid and infringed at trial. Under
current law, Firm A’s expected payoff from litigating is:
$60 million net

0.2 – $10 million

0.8

$4 million.

With enhanced rewards and penalties, Firm A’s expected payoff from litigating is:
$74.4 million

0.2 – $24.4 million

0.8

– $4.64 million.

The addition of enhanced rewards and penalties thus transforms Firm A’s decision to litigate
this weak patent from a reasonable gamble with a positive payoff into a losing proposition.110
This will have feedback effects on Firm A’s other uses of the patent. Firm A will not be able to
extract substantial concessions during licensing negotiations or settlement if it stands to lose
money if it proceeds to trial. This is exactly as it should be: we are better off if this patent is
never so much as mentioned in a threatening letter, much less asserted at trial.
The analytic discussion that began this section set forth the optimal measure of enhanced
rewards and penalties. And the numerical example that followed was of course just one example.
But it is crucial to note that enhanced rewards and penalties will improve trial outcomes for
owners of valuable patents and harm trial outcomes for owners of invalid patents any time that
courts and litigants are more accurate than flipping coins. That is, if courts reach the right
outcome at trial more than 50% of the time, and litigants know whether they have a valid or
invalid patent with at least 50% accuracy, and the enhanced reward or penalty is greater than
zero, then the system we describe will benefit holders of valid patents and harm holders of
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invalid ones.111 It is not necessary that private parties have any informational advantages over
courts (though it would be helpful). Nor is it necessary that the two parties have asymmetric (or
symmetric) beliefs or information. The mechanism of enhanced rewards and penalties will
function properly so long as each actor is more accurate than a coin flip. It is thus robust to an
extremely wide range of parameters.
To illustrate this point, consider the following extreme numerical example. Suppose courts
are 51% accurate at determining whether a patent is valid or invalid; parties are similarly 51%
accurate at determining the validity of the patent at suit; and enhanced rewards and penalties are
set at $1,000. The holder of a valid patent will likely receive an enhanced trial award of:
$1000

0.51 – $1000

0.49

$20.

The holder of an invalid patent will likely be assessed a penalty of:
$1000

0.51 – $1000

0.49

$20.

Suppose that a patent owner owns a valid and valuable patent but only knows this with 51%
probability. The patent owner will anticipate an enhanced payoff of:
$20

0.51 – $20

0.49

$0.40.

In symmetric fashion, an owner of an invalid patent would anticipate an enhanced penalty of
–$0.40. The high degree of inaccuracy depresses the impact of the enhanced rewards and
penalties. But the principle nonetheless holds: firms with valuable patents will be compensated in
part for their litigation risk, while firms with valueless patents will be punished for threatening
suit.
By consequence, firms with valid, valuable patents will be even more likely to file suit; firms
with invalid, socially worthless patents will be less likely to file suit or assert those patents
against genuine innovators. Most importantly, this mechanism will function without any gains in
accuracy by the courts or the PTO. Private parties will adjust simply as a matter of their own
incentives and their perceived likelihood of success. The result will be fewer lawsuits based upon
invalid patents and greater rewards for owners of valid, valuable intellectual property rights.
C. WHO PAYS WHOM?

The discussion thus far has been directed toward properly setting the patent holder’s
incentives. The goal is to reward holders of valuable patents in order to incentivize further
research and development, while simultaneously dissuading owners of worthless patents from
filing suit. We have not yet addressed the question of who should pay for patent owners’
enhanced rewards and who should be paid when patent owners are assessed enhanced penalties.
We take up those questions in this section, and again we reach a counterintuitive conclusion: the
111

If courts are less than 50% accurate—that is, worse than a coin flip—then it makes no sense to have courts
deciding patent cases in the first place. If the courts cannot be improved, we would be better off abolishing them
and flipping coins. We cannot prove that courts are better than a coin flip, but we suspect (or at least hope) that this
is the case.

structure of payments should not be symmetric. Successful patent challengers should be paid by
the patent holders who litigated against them; but victorious patent holders should be paid by the
public, rather than the patent challenger who has been found to infringe. This is contrary to the
norm in American civil litigation that, aside from the costs of litigation, damages paid by the
defendant are equal to the damages received by the plaintiff.112
1. Victorious Patent Owner
When a patent owner in possession of a valuable property right prevails at trial, it would
seem obvious at first blush that the patent challenger should be forced to pay for the enhanced
rewards. After all, it is the challenger who has created the costs in the first instance. However,
this might inhibit valuable challenges to bad patents as well—a losing infringer could face very
substantial liability under this rule. Challengers to bad patents are providing public goods: if they
invalidate a socially harmful property right, a broad spectrum of innovators will reap the
benefits.113 When a court invalidates a patent, it benefits the consumers of the underlying product
as well as all competing firms that might wish to enter the relevant market—not just the firm that
prevailed in the lawsuit.114 As a result, a patent challenger only internalizes a small fraction of
the benefits of a successful suit. There will be many instances in which it would be socially
productive if a patent were challenged but not privately worthwhile for any individual firm, and
the challenge will not take place.115 For instance, suppose that a semiconductor manufacturer
holds a patent on a valuable computer chip. The patent, however, is plausibly invalid—the chip
is too similar to one that preceded it. It would be socially productive if another semiconductor
firm were to challenge the patent and attempt to invalidate it because the price of the chip would
fall if the challenge were successful. But it might not be worthwhile for another manufacturer to
do so. That firm would bear the full cost of the challenge, including the damages it would have to
pay if it were found to be infringing. But it would capture only a fraction of the value of
invalidating the patent. The original manufacturer would still control part of the market, and
other semiconductor firms that did not participate in the lawsuit could swoop in and capture
market share as well. The challenger would be largely providing a benefit to other parties. This is
why there are likely too few patent challenges over all. It makes little sense to impose additional
taxes on patent challengers and potentially further dissuade them from producing such public
goods.
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Another possibility is paying for the additional rewards out of general tax revenues. The
government could provide a direct monetary award as part of the remedies phase of the litigation.
This would avoid distortions in the behavior of potential patent challengers. However, we think a
superior solution would be for future consumers of the innovative firm’s products to pay for
these rewards. The reason is fairness—or at least distributional neutrality. The reason for
creating supplemental rewards is to eliminate the disincentive for future innovation imposed by
non-meritorious litigation. The beneficiaries of this future innovation are the future consumers of
the firm’s products. Thus, it is more fair—and there is less needless redistribution of wealth—if
future consumers pay for these supplemental rewards.
The more difficult question is how to identify and collect from these future consumers. It is,
of course, impossible to know precisely who will purchase a firm’s products in the future. But
the firm’s current consumers (or those people who will be purchasers in the near future) might
serve as a reasonable proxy. Individuals who are purchasing Apple products today are probably
most likely to purchase them in the future; individuals (or businesses) who buy one Dell
computer are more likely to purchase another Dell computer; and so forth.116 The government
could conceivably impose a special tax on current or future purchases of a firm’s products, with
that tax being paid directly to the firm. But this would be counterproductive. It would amount to
a state-imposed price hike on a firm’s goods, which would presumably decrease the quantities of
those goods sold. It is safe to assume that each firm is pricing its own goods so as to maximize
profits—or, at least, that the firm is better at doing so than the government would be.117 Most
firms would simply lower their prices, returning the overall price of the product to its prior level.
A separate tax, even one paid directly to the firm, would not be an improvement.
A better solution is to extend the terms of the patents at suit.118 Consider a change in the law
that allowed courts to award additional years at the end of a patent term any time a patent holder
won a lawsuit for infringement of that patent. The firm would garner further monopoly profits
from this extended term, providing additional rewards for its innovation. These rewards would
be paid for by consumers who purchase that firm’s products in the near future—again, a
reasonable proxy for those consumers who will purchase future products made by the same
firm.119
It would not be difficult for a court (or Congress) to properly price the size of this
supplemental reward. Recall that the supplemental reward should equal (
.
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term represents the potential loss of patent term length if that patent is improperly

invalidated at trial. If the value of a patent over its lifespan is approximately constant, a court
should just extend a patent’s term by
—the ratio of transaction costs to the
annual value of the patent, plus the number of valuable years of the patent term put at risk at trial
discounted by the probability that the patent could have been mistakenly invalidated. If litigation
costs are small relative to annual profits from a patent—that is, if
—one could ignore the
term.120 This would eliminate any need to calculate precisely the average yearly value of the
patent, which a court would have to undertake if it were awarding supplemental monetary
damages. The fact that it is the patent itself that is being extended renders this accounting
unnecessary. Imagine, for instance, that a patent holder wins an infringement lawsuit based on
conduct that began fourteen years after the patent at suit was granted. Six years remain on the
patent term. Suppose that the court estimates that the error rate in such cases involving valid
patents is 20%.121 In addition to the usual remedies, the court would extend the patent’s term by
an additional 0.84 years, or approximately 10 months.122 There could also be a small additional
adjustment (
) for the fixed cost of the patent litigation even if
.123
The potential downside of extending the patent term—as opposed to simply paying the
patentee from general tax revenues—is that it could lead to increased deadweight economic
losses. As we explained above, the virtue of a patent is that it provides the patentee with a limited
monopoly over a good, allowing the patentee to charge monopolistic prices (rather than
competitive prices). These higher prices incentivize further research and innovation, but they are
also conventionally thought to price some consumers out of the market. When a consumer who
would have purchased the good at a competitive price cannot afford it at its monopoly price,
there is a resulting deadweight loss in the form of diminished consumer welfare.124
This is an important consideration, though it may well be outweighed by the other
advantages of extending the patent term. The main case for a twenty-year patent is that the
innovative effects from exclusivity of that duration exceeds the deadweight loss from that
exclusivity. That argument is typically made while ignoring the litigation costs from patent
challenges and assuming no court errors when challenges are litigated. Our patent extension and
120
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penalties are designed to return the period of exclusivity to the balance that would be achieved
under a twenty-year patent without challenges. Moreover, it is possible that the conventional
belief that patents lead to monopoly prices and deadweight losses is overstated. In separate work,
we have argued that creative pricing mechanisms can eliminate the deadweight loss associated
with patents by ensuring that no (or very few) consumers are priced out of the market for
patented goods.125 We further demonstrate that these pricing mechanisms are in use across a
broad spectrum of industries.126 If we are correct, the case against patent term extensions
dissipates substantially.
A second concern with our approach is that it relies upon a questionable assumption: that the
value of a patent is approximately constant over time. If a patent declines in value over time,
additional years after the end of the typical patent term will be insufficient to compensate the
patent holder for the risk of losing earlier years before the end of the patent’s life. In the limiting
case, a patent may even be worthless by the end of its life. This assumption of constant patent
value is fairly conservative for pharmaceuticals and for many types of medical devices, which
sell for a higher price and at higher quantities at the end of their life than they do at the
beginning127 due to advertising.128 But it does not hold true for most semiconductor and
computer patents, which are generally valueless after four or five years as they are outpaced by
advances in technology.129 Accordingly, in designing supplemental remedies it might be
necessary to draw distinctions among industries. Owners of pharmaceutical patents would
receive an additional patent-term length, while owners of computer-related patents would receive
direct monetary payments from the government. We do not pause to dwell on the specifics of
this proposal here but instead explore the idea of industry-specific treatment in greater detail in
Part IV. In addition, in that Part we suggest modifications to the proposal for supplemental
remedies that may obviate the particular issue of whether to grant additional term length or
supplemental money damages.
2. Victorious Patent Challenger
As we explained above, there will generally be too few patent challenges because patent
challengers cannot fully internalize the benefits of their success. In order to incentivize greater
numbers of patent challenges, it makes sense to offer additional rewards or bounties to patent
challengers who succeed in court. Accordingly, when a patent challenger prevails and forces a
patent owner to pay heightened penalties, those penalties should be paid to the patent challenger.
The Hatch–Waxman Act accomplishes this in the context of pharmaceutical patents by offering
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successful patent challengers 180 days of market exclusivity.130 In effect, we are suggesting a
Hatch–Waxman-type rule for every type of patent.
In addition to the positive incentive effects, forcing defeated patent owners to pay enhanced
penalties to victorious challengers would have valuable distributional effects. When a patent
owner asserts an invalid patent, it is the competitor—the patent challenger—who stands to be
harmed most directly. The invalid patent functions as a mechanism for taxing the genuine
innovation in which the competitor has engaged. This in turn harms consumers of the patent
challenger’s products, who are forced to pay higher prices because of this tax. The enhanced
penalties paid to patent challengers would compensate them, in the aggregate, for the risk that
they will be unfairly taxed at trial. As the costs of innovation decrease, so too will the prices of
patent challengers’ goods. The end beneficiaries will be the consumers who have been
shouldering the costs of unmeritorious litigation all along.
D. RELATED APPROACHES

1. The English Rule
The solution we offer above bears a family resemblance to a more pedigreed legal
mechanism: the “loser pays” or “English Rule.” In jurisdictions that have adopted the English
Rule, the losing party in litigation must pay the prevailing party’s costs and attorneys’ fees.131 If
courts and juries in patent cases are accurate most of the time, then applying the English Rule
should be generally beneficial: holders of strong patents would see their rewards increase, and
holders of weak patents would see theirs diminish. Yet we do not believe that it would be
appropriate to straightforwardly apply the English Rule in patent cases.
There is an extensive literature on the advantages and disadvantages of the English Rule, in
comparison to the standard American Rule in which both sides bear their own costs,132 and we
will not recapitulate that literature here.133 It suffices to note three particular reasons why we do
not believe that the English Rule is advisable or adequate. First, it is well understood that the
English Rule can cause distortions in litigation behavior by encouraging litigants to increase their
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litigation expenditures, figuring that their opponents will eventually have to pay.134 The greater
the differential in resources between the two sides, the greater the distortions: a wealthy litigant
can threaten to effectively bankrupt a poorer opponent in the event of victory.135 This is
especially important in the context of patent disputes between small start-up companies and large
commercial firms, which we described in Part II above. There, the problem is that litigation costs
are relatively minor for the large commercial entity but enormous for the much smaller firm,
impinging on the smaller firm’s ability to effectively defend its patents. Forcing the smaller firm
to account for the risk of bearing the larger firm’s costs would only exacerbate this problem.
One partial solution might be to institute an “infringer-pays” rule, rather than the neutral
English Rule. Under such a rule, a defendant held liable for infringement would pay the
plaintiff’s costs and fees, but a defeated plaintiff would not be responsible for the defendant’s
fees.136 This would shield plaintiff start-up companies from huge losses in the event that they
were defeated by larger competitors. However, it would not solve the correlative problem of
larger firms using their extensive portfolios to threaten smaller competitors who possess valuable
patents.137 If those threats became litigation, the smaller firms would still be at risk of financial
ruin in the event that they lost. Of course, a finding that the small firm had infringed the larger
firm’s patents might have exactly the same effect, making the addition of attorneys’ fees
irrelevant. Accordingly, an infringer-pays rule might be preferable.138
Yet this in turn raises the second problem with the English Rule, which is that it could
unreasonably diminish incentives to bring patent challenges, including worthwhile challenges to
invalid patents.139 As we explained above, worthwhile patent challenges produce public goods.140
Consequently, there are generally fewer patent challenges than would be optimal. The English
Rule would exacerbate this problem by increasing the penalties for unsuccessful patent
challenges, further dissuading potential challengers from litigating. It is for this reason that we
advocate paying successful patent owners through patent extensions, rather than forcing patent
challengers to shoulder the cost. One could imagine instead instituting a “plaintiff pays” rule, in
which only unsuccessful patent plaintiffs must shoulder the other side’s costs. But this would
merely return to the problems described in the paragraphs above.
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It is additionally worth noting that at the time of this writing, a bill has been introduced in the
House of Representatives that would establish a similarly asymmetric fee-shifting rule. The
“Shield Act” would allow courts to order patent plaintiffs to pay alleged infringers’ attorneys’
fees—“upon making a determination that the party alleging the infringement of the patent did not
have a reasonable likelihood of succeeding.”141 The bill is incomplete and flawed as currently
written. It would do nothing to compensate holders of valuable patents for the risk that their
patents might be erroneously overturned, and in fact it would only reduce the value of those
patents further. But it nonetheless represents a promising step in the right direction.
None of these formulations of the fee-shifting rule eliminates the third shortcoming of that
approach, which is that litigation costs constitute an extremely small fraction of the potential lost
value of a patent in the event of an erroneous judicial decision. Holders of valuable patents face
two sorts of costs when they become targets: litigation costs and costs associated with the
possibility that a patent will be mistakenly held invalid (or not infringed). The former cost is not
insignificant, but it can be dwarfed by the latter. The average patent case that is litigated to final
judgment costs each side on the order of $5 million.142 Yet a single patent—particularly a patent
on a successful pharmaceutical—could be worth hundreds of millions or even billions of dollars
per year. Consider a patent valued at $500 million that is 10% likely to be invalidated at trial.
Each time that patent’s owner goes to trial, the litigation costs represent less than 10% of the
total expected loss that litigation presents.143 The English Rule, standing alone, is thus far from a
full solution.
2. Insurance Claims and Fraud
To the best of our knowledge there is no legal system that formally replicates the structure of
enhanced rewards and penalties that we have described here. However, a rough facsimile has
developed in the field of insurance law.144 If an insurance claimant files a fraudulent claim, she
runs the risk of not only having that claim denied but in addition facing criminal penalties for
insurance fraud.145 On the other hand, if an insurance claimant files a valid claim and the insurer
unreasonably or fraudulently denies the claim, the claimant can in some cases collect punitive
damages from the insurance company.146 Insurance law thus functions as a two-sided system of
enhanced rewards and penalties, at least in extreme cases. We can think of the insurance
claimant as standing in the shoes of the patent holder, and the insurance company in the role of
the alleged infringer.
There is a potential concern that the possibility of enhanced rewards—punitive damages for
fraudulent denial of an insurance claim—could lead insured parties to sandbag their insurers. The
insured would withhold key information in an attempt to induce the insurer to deny the claim,
and then deploy that information in order to convince a court that the insurer’s actions had been
141
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fraudulent. A system of enhanced rewards and penalties could conceivably become
counterproductive if such behavior migrated to patent law.
To the extent that this concern even exists in insurance law,147 we do not believe that it would
be present in patent law. The premise behind such chicanery is that insured parties possess
private information about their claims or themselves. It is this private information that they are
able to first withhold and then deploy. But patentees possess no such private information: the
patent, its prosecution history, and all relevant prior art are all public. There is nothing for the
patentee to withhold, and thus no opportunity for such strategic behavior.148
*

*

*

If verdicts in patent cases tend to be inaccurate, it would seem misguided to suggest raising
the stakes of those cases. But that is precisely what we propose here. Providing enhanced
rewards for patent owners who succeed at trial and enhanced penalties for owners who fail
would force owners of valid and invalid patents to self-sort. Owners of valid, valuable patents
would realize greater rewards from asserting those patents, and thus greater incentives to
innovate in the first instance. Owners of invalid patents would have substantially less to gain at
trial, and thus less ability to extract rents from genuine innovators. Such a system of heightened
rewards and penalties would have substantial salutary effects, even if courts never became more
accurate.
IV. REFINEMENTS AND CAVEATS
So far we have laid out the basic theory behind our proposal for raising the stakes in patent
cases. As we have explained, policymakers need not estimate courts’ error rates precisely or
calculate reward and penalty multipliers perfectly for our proposal to improve the patent system.
All that is necessary is (1) that courts and parties are more than 50% accurate—that is, better
than a coin flip; and (2) that the supplemental penalties and rewards are greater than zero. So
long as these two conditions are met, any implementation would represent an improvement from
the status quo.
But policymakers could in fact do much better if they so chose. In the sections that follow,
we highlight a number of refinements that would enhance the effectiveness of our proposal in
substantial ways. We also address a number of potential problems with such a system and
provide workable solutions. First, we describe how policymakers could tailor a system of
enhanced rewards and benefits to particular inventive industries, applying enhanced rewards in
147
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industries where patents are generally valuable and the risk of erroneous invalidation is highest,
and enhanced penalties in industries characterized by excessive patenting and patent holdup. We
then discuss how our proposal might be implemented, and by which institutional actors. We
analyze the effects of enhanced rewards and penalties on settlement behavior. And we close by
addressing the problems that arise if patent plaintiffs are judgment-proof.
A. INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC TREATMENT

The system of enhanced rewards and penalties that we propose will effectively separate
holders of valid and invalid patents by adjusting their incentives at trial. But it might be possible
to increase the specificity and precision of this system by applying it piecemeal. Certain types of
lawsuits would be eligible for enhanced rewards but not penalties; other types of lawsuits could
be opened to enhanced penalties but not rewards.
For instance, consider the role of non-practicing entities (NPEs). These are firms that do not
actually produce or market any product or service, and often do no research, either. Instead, they
simply own patents and use those patents to secure licensing fees or litigation judgments against
productive commercial firms. It might be possible to take advantage of the fact that NPEs file a
disproportionate share of the lawsuits in which invalid patents are asserted.149 That is to say, a
lawsuit brought by an NPE is more likely to involve an overbroad or invalid patent, or one that
contributed no useful innovation, than a lawsuit brought by a commercial firm. If the goal is to
avoid benefitting holders of these sorts of patents, NPEs should be separated from other types of
patent plaintiffs.
The most direct method for accomplishing this would be to not award enhanced rewards to
any patent plaintiff that has not produced a product in the technological area covered by its
patent in suit. One could even imagine very particular tests, such as: plaintiffs will not be eligible
for enhanced remedies unless they have made $X million in sales of a product covered by the
patent at suit.
There are a number of problems with this approach. The first is that it would disadvantage
small start-up companies and other firms that might eventually become commercial entities but
have not yet produced products. (It also might be seen as an invitation to infringe patents that
have simply not yet been commercialized.) However, this will be an issue with any sorting
mechanism based around whether or not a firm is an NPE. A firm’s NPE status is not a perfect
proxy for the true variable of interest—whether the firm is asserting an invalid or overbroad
patent. Using it as a proxy will inevitably lead to errors of over-inclusion (start-up firms) and
under-inclusion (commercial firms asserting invalid patents).
The larger flaw with this sorting mechanism is that it would incentivize firms to evade it by
simply transferring their patents to other companies. Consider a true patent troll, P, a firm that
exists only to hold patents and assert them against commercial entities. Imagine that it holds a
patent that could plausibly cover a product produced by both Firm A and Firm B, two large
commercial firms. Under this rule, P could not obtain enhanced remedies against either Firm A
or Firm B. Instead, it could choose to sell the patent to Firm A. Firm A would be willing to pay P
the expected value of P’s suit against Firm A, plus the expected value of Firm A’s potential suit
against Firm B. The expected value of that suit would involve enhanced remedies, because Firm
149

Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 BERKELEY
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A manufactures a product covered by the patent. P would have enhanced the value of its property
right simply by transferring it to a different type of party.150 Not only would this frustrate the
purpose of a rule excluding NPEs from accessing enhanced patent remedies, it would also create
incentives for firms to expend resources on transfers of intellectual property rights that create no
social wealth whatsoever but produce transaction costs.
This concern is mitigated somewhat by the rarity of large commercial competitors litigating
infringement suits against one another to judgment.151 The reason is that they have too much to
lose: in many cases, each firm holds a substantial portfolio of patents that the other firm is
plausibly infringing.152 If one firm were to file suit, it would risk a countersuit that could be just
as damaging.153 Both firms would expend millions of dollars in litigation costs without gaining a
clear advantage. For this reason, larger commercial firms typically prefer to enter into crosslicensing agreements with one another, rather than litigating to judgment.154 In addition, the
patents held by trolls may be duplicative of patents already held by these large commercial
firms—particularly when it comes to devices that are covered by hundreds or even thousands of
patents.155 In the hands of a major commercial firm, one additional patent may confer little
additional value. Nonetheless, it is always possible that a patent troll would be able to find a
higher value commercial buyer for its patents, resulting in wasteful transactions and evasion of
the limits on heightened remedies.
In light of this, an industry-focused approach might be superior. This approach takes
advantage of the fact that certain industries and areas of technology are characterized by
substantial activity by NPEs and patent trolls, and others are not. One could consider awarding
enhanced rewards only to victorious patent plaintiffs who hold patents in industries and technical
fields that do not involve significant activity by trolls: pharmaceutical drugs, biotechnology,
medical devices, chemicals, optics, machinery, and the like.156 Victorious plaintiffs in industries
with significant activity by patent trolls—software, computers, electronics, semiconductors, and
similar fields—would be denied access to these enhanced remedies. In symmetric fashion, one
could consider limiting the availability of enhanced penalties to industries with substantial troll
activity.
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Firm A and P would presumably split the value of the enhanced remedies between them, according to their
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innovation. This makes this particular solution somewhat more appealing.
151
This is not to say that large firms do not file suit against one another. See Chien, supra note 80, at 1572 (“I found
that public and large private companies initiated 42% of all lawsuits studied, 28% of the time against other large
companies . . . .”). The difference is that monetary awards are rarely the outcome or the objective of large-firm
litigation. See infra notes 152-54 and accompanying text.
152
See Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent Ecosystem and Its Implications for
the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 299 (2010).
153
Id. (“To guard against the risk of patent litigation, companies acquire patents so they can retaliate against or
neutralize threats of suits brought by their competitors.”).
154
See id. at 307–10.
155
See, e.g., David Drummond, When Patents Attack Android, GOOGLE OFFICIAL BLOG,
http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2011/08/when-patents-attack-android.html (Aug. 3, 2011) (“A smartphone might
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This proposal draws upon a literature suggesting that courts are already creating different
patent rules for different industries157 and recommending that Congress or the PTO do the same
even more explicitly.158 There is also a direct analogy to the Supreme Court’s approach to
injunctive remedies in eBay v. MercExchange. There, several concurring justices noted that not
all industries, and not all patent plaintiffs, are equivalent.159 Where there is an especially high
risk of patent holdup, or where there is reason to believe that the plaintiff’s assertion of its patent
rights will hinder rather than promote innovation, the Court hinted that it disfavored injunctive
relief.160 To date, these types of industry-by-industry adjustments have been made largely by the
courts,161 though Congress162 and the PTO have intervened on very limited occasions.163 It may
be appropriate for the courts to take the lead again here, or it might be advantageous for
Congress or an administrative agency to play a significant role. The institutional details are
interesting and important but beyond the scope of this Article. What is important is that industryby-industry distinctions such as the one we are proposing are hardly foreign to patent law.
Could this arrangement similarly be gamed by opportunistic patent trolls? One option would
be for trolls to simply cease activity in a given industry, goading courts into offering enhanced
remedies, before resuming litigious activities. Yet this is highly improbable for any number of
reasons. If trolls could convince courts to allow enhanced remedies by ceasing activity, courts
would presumably turn the spigot back off once trolls resumed litigating. Patent trolls would also
cost themselves a tremendous amount of money by ceasing activity simply in order to tap into
greater enhanced remedies at some future date. And patent trolls would also have to engage in a
significant amount of concerted action (actually, nonaction) in order to implement this plan. This
creates a severe collective action problem—any given patent troll would benefit enormously
from defecting from an agreement and continuing to litigate.
A more likely possibility is that trolls might migrate from the technical fields they currently
inhabit to other industries (such as pharmaceuticals) where the remedies are more generous. If it
became standard practice for patent trolls to “follow the money” in this fashion,164 any strategy
that relied upon distinctions between industries would be quickly eroded.
However, it is extremely difficult—if not impossible—for patent trolls to take up residence
within another industry or technical field. The reason has nothing to do with the expertise within
those firms, or the types of patents owned by trolls. If those were the barriers, trolls could simply
hire experts in other technical areas and purchase other patents. Rather, some industries are
simply more conducive to predatory patent behavior than others. The reason appears to be that it
is easier in some fields than in others to specify an invention for purposes of a patent. In the
pharmaceutical and chemical industries, for instance, a patentee can specify a drug or chemical
157
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with a great deal of precision by describing the molecule involved. Any given invention is
usually covered by only a small number of significant patents165—hence the often-stated
principle of “one molecule, one patent.”166 Consequently, old patents can rarely be re-interpreted
in broad fashion to cover new inventions. The opportunities for trolls are greatly limited. It is for
this reason that these industries—and others, such as machinery and optics—are not generally
thought to have many trolls currently operating. If trolls could gain a foothold litigating in these
fields, they would already have done so; there is no reason for them to have artificially confined
their activity to certain industries. The relative absence of troll-like behavior is therefore best
understood as a function of the way in which patents interact with and describe the relevant
technology.
Accordingly, we believe that it will be possible to obtain the advantages of enhanced
remedies while minimizing the harm done by patent trolls by limiting these enhanced remedies
by industry. There will be some definitional issues at the margins—parties may argue over
whether a particular patent covers computers or machinery, for instance—but these are the types
of issues that courts are well-equipped to decide.167 The distinctions we seek to draw are
necessarily crude, but here these crude distinctions may function better than either finer
distinctions, which can be gamed, or the status quo.
B. IMPLEMENTATION AND MEASUREMENT

The proposal we have described is not one that could be easily implemented by courts under
current law. To begin with, there is no provision in law that would allow courts to assess the
types of enhanced rewards and penalties that we advocate. The Patent Act permits courts to
“increase the damages [found by a jury] up to three times the amount found or assessed,”168 and
courts have employed this provision to assess treble damages in cases of “willful”
infringement.169 The Patent Act also permits courts to award attorneys’ fees in “exceptional
cases.”170 Importantly, however, both provisions only allow courts to increase the amount paid
by the defendant to the plaintiff. There is no law that would enable courts to award heightened
damages paid out of public funds, and no mechanism for penalizing patent plaintiffs who bring
unmeritorious suits.171
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In addition, our proposal relies on determining the (approximate) accuracy of courts across
patent cases. We have no illusion of courts’ ability to ascertain this figure themselves. The
judges of a court do not have the time to scrutinize one another’s opinions for error, nor would
they be eager to point out their colleagues’ errors even if they discovered them.172
Accordingly, legislative or administrative action will be necessary. Congress could
implement such an arrangement by legislation, or (perhaps preferably) could delegate the task to
an administrative agency.173 In either event, a panel of outside experts should be tasked with
reviewing a random sample of completed patent cases and determining courts’ error rate.
C. SETTLEMENT

Thus far our discussion has focused on outcomes at trial, and we have only alluded to
licensing and settlement negotiations. These negotiations make up a significant fraction of the
economic activity surrounding patents, but our general neglect of them has been deliberate. The
reason is simple: settlement and licensing occur in the shadow of expected trial outcomes.174 The
more that a plaintiff and defendant believe the plaintiff will win at trial, the greater the amount
they will settle for (in the event that they settle).175 The less the plaintiff has to gain at trial, the
lower the settlement price.176 Accordingly, a system of enhanced rewards and penalties will
increase the amount that owners of valid, valuable patents will earn in licensing negotiations and
decrease the amount that owners of invalid patents will be able to extract. These changes in
settlement outcomes will mirror the changes in expected trial outcomes.177
Nor should a symmetric system of enhanced rewards and penalties affect the likelihood of
settlement. Settlement is valuable because it allows both sides to avoid the substantial expense
involved in litigating.178 When parties fail to settle, it is typically because they disagree on the
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likely outcome of the case.179 If either party has private information that leads her to believe that
she is more likely to win, the two sides will not be able to come to an agreement.180 That is, the
decision to litigate rather than settling is driven by differences in information. Here, the system
of enhanced rewards and penalties introduces no private or asymmetric information. Both parties
will have the same information regarding the multipliers used to calculate enhanced rewards and
penalties, and both parties will be able to perform the same calculations to the same degree of
accuracy. If the parties would be inclined to settle absent a system of enhanced rewards and
penalties, the introduction of that system will not dissuade them.
The one factor that could impact settlement is the proposal we outlined above for paying
victorious patent plaintiffs from general tax revenues or via a patent term extension, rather than
forcing losing defendants to pay. The reason is that this third-party payment to plaintiffs
decouples plaintiffs’ and defendants’ incentives, making trial worth more to plaintiffs if they
have valuable patents. Consider a simple numerical example. Suppose that a plaintiff is 80%
likely to prevail at trial, damages in the case will be $100 million, and the cost of litigating will
be $10 million for each side. Absent a system of enhanced rewards and penalties, plaintiff’s
expected payoff from going to trial would be:
$100 million

0.8 – $10 million

$70 million.

Defendant’s expected payoff from going to trial would be:
–$100 million

0.8 – $10 million

–$90 million.

Plaintiff and defendant thus should be willing to settle for any amount between $70 million and
$90 million.
Now consider the effect of adding enhanced rewards and penalties equal to $10 million, with
the reward coming via a patent term extension rather than from defendants. Plaintiff’s expected
payoff from going to trial would be:
$110 million

0.8 – $10 million

0.2 ‐ $10 million

$76 million.

Note that the plaintiff obtains an additional $10 million if she wins (with probability 0.8), but
loses $10 million if she loses (with probability 0.2). Defendant’s expected payoff from going to
trial would be:
–$100 million
179

0.8

$10 million

0.2 – $10 million

$88 million.

George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9–12 (1984).
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side has systematically better information. Even if one thought, for example, that the patent holder had better
information on validity, the outcome of the settlement game depends on who is able to make a final take-it-or-leaveit offer. See, e.g., Lucian Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J. OF ECON.
404, 405, 414 (1984) (describing model in which the less informed party makes final offer); Jennifer F. Reinganum
& Louis L. Wilde, Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs, 17 RAND J. ECON. 557, 558–59
(1986) (describing model in which the better informed party has ability to make final offer). We certainly do not
know a priori who has that sort of bargaining power.
180

Whereas the plaintiff’s enhanced gain does not come from the defendant’s pocket, her loss
does go to the defendant. Plaintiff and defendant would then be willing to settle only for any
amount between $76 million and $88 million. The available bargaining range has shrunk from
$20 million ($90 million – $70 million) to $12 million ($88 million – $76 million). This will
decrease the likelihood of settlement.181
The result will be fewer settlements on the whole and more patent trials. This would most
likely increase social welfare with respect to invalid or dubious patents, because those patents
will be invalidated at trial and cannot later be asserted against other alleged infringers. But it will
decrease social welfare with respect to valid patents by forcing the parties to incur litigation costs
that might otherwise have been avoided. The net effects will be ambiguous and will depend on
the percentages of asserted patents that are valid and invalid. This might constitute an argument
for eschewing the asymmetric mechanism we recommend in which plaintiffs pay enhanced
penalties to patent challengers but are paid enhanced remedies by the public.
The important point is that enhanced rewards and penalties will improve settlement outcomes
for holders of valid patents and worsen them for holders of invalid patents. For instance, in the
numerical example above, the midpoint of the bargaining range absent enhanced rewards and
penalties is $80 million. That midpoint rises to $82 million once enhanced rewards and penalties
are introduced. The salutary effects of enhanced rewards and penalties will persist irrespective of
whether litigants settle their cases or proceed to trial.
D. RISK AVERSION

One concern with our proposal for enhanced rewards and penalties is that they increase the
amount of litigation risk to which the patent holder and challenger are exposed. To the extent
that these parties are risk averse,182 our proposal would appear to reduce these parties’ welfare.
This is not a critical objection to our basic proposal because parties can insure against litigation
risk by settling cases. In the basic settlement model we employed in the last section, a reduction
in utility or corporate welfare due to risk aversion to larger litigation stakes operates just like a
litigation cost—it reduces the patent holder’s gain from litigating and increases the patent
challenger’s loss to litigating. The combined effect is to reduce the parties’ utility from going to
trial, making settlement even more attractive. If the parties settle, they do not face the same
litigation risk.
Interestingly, risk aversion offsets part of the problem raised by the variant of our proposal
that has enhanced rewards funded partly by taxpayers or future consumers. In the previous
section we explained that this decoupling of enhanced rewards from defendant payments
increases the amount that the plaintiff expects to obtain at trial more than it increases the amount
that the defendant expects to pay at trial. Because the scope for settlement is proportional to the
181
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amount that the defendant expects to pay above and beyond what the plaintiff expects to receive,
decoupled enhanced rewards reduce the scope for settlement. For reasons we gave in the last
paragraph, however, decoupled enhanced rewards also increase the plaintiff’s cost of litigation
due to risk aversion. This reduces the payoff that patent holders can expect from trial, offsetting
some of the increased return from decoupled enhanced rewards. The offset is not complete
because the enhanced reward is similar to a strictly positive value lottery. Positive value
lotteries—for example, heads you win $5 and tails you win $10—have positive value to both
risk-averse and non-risk-averse individuals. That is, both individuals would pay a positive
amount to face the lottery, though the risk-averse individual would be willing to pay less than the
non-risk-averse individual to face it. In summary, risk aversion reduces some (but not all) of the
anticipated returns to enhanced rewards and penalties but also ameliorates some of the reduction
in settlement rates caused by decoupled enhanced rewards.
E. INSOLVENT PLAINTIFFS AND SHAM LAWSUITS

We close with two relatively discrete but important issues. First, it is essential that patent
plaintiffs have the capacity to pay enhanced penalties if they lose at trial. Patent plaintiffs could
conceivably evade their responsibility for enhanced penalties by transferring their patents to
under-funded shell corporations and then using those corporations to bring suit. If the suit failed,
the corporation would not have the resources to pay the penalty judgment.
This is a real problem but one that is easily addressed. Patent plaintiffs should be forced to
either post a litigation bond or purchase insurance against being assessed an enhanced penalty.183
The bond or insurance would be pegged to the damages demanded by the plaintiff: the greater
the damages, the greater the bond or insurance.
Second, and lastly, it is always possible that patent holders will take advantage of the
prospect of supplemental rewards by arranging sham lawsuits, which they then win at trial. Sham
suits present a real concern, but they are hardly unique to this context—patent law offers
numerous opportunities for patent holders and challengers to gain advantages via sham
lawsuits.184 As in other areas of patent law, they can be policed through other means, principally
an examination of connections between the plaintiff and defendant in a given suit and the parties
with economic interests on both sides of the case.185 The PTO has already begun to take steps in
this direction.186 The threat of fraud thus does not provide an adequate basis for rejecting
supplemental patent remedies.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have documented how patent challenges, patent law’s ex post attempt to
correct mistakes made by the PTO, can undermine the initial goals of patents. Because of
183
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mistakes in the selection of patents by challengers and errors by courts in determining which
patents are valid, patent challenges can penalize valid patents, thereby discouraging innovation,
and protect some invalid patents, sustaining deadweight loss and taxing true innovation. One
solution to the problem is to make patent challengers and courts more accurate. Where that is
difficult, we propose an alternative, counterintuitive solution: increase the stakes in patent
challenges. We recommend that patent owners whose patents are upheld at trial be given a
reward—in the form of a patent extension—on top of the damages they usually get in court.
Similarly, patent owners whose patents are held invalid by a court should be forced to pay a
penalty to patent challengers. This will increase the wedge between the payoffs of having a
patent upheld in courts and having it struck down by a court. So long as courts are better than a
coin flip at determining whether a patent is truly valid, this approach will reward holders of truly
valid patents and punish holders of truly invalid patents. Courts need not be perfectly accurate
for our solution to work. Indeed, the higher stakes are a substitute for more accuracy.
Although our proposal seems bold, it is actually fairly narrow. Whereas we only use higher
stakes to correct for skewed incentives created by imperfect patent challenges, higher stakes can
also be used to correct for other flaws in the patent system, including the possibility that supracompetitive profits from market exclusivity may not fully capture the full social gains from
innovation187 or that market exclusivity may discourage follow-on innovation.188 In some sense,
this is not at all surprising. Because the threat of damages awarded by court is ultimately how
patent laws are enforced, those laws can be changed substantially by altering damages that courts
award.
Although manipulating the stakes in patent challenges can be used to tackle broader issues of
patent policy, the choice between addressing the problem of imperfect challenges by increasing
the accuracy of courts or by changing the patent approval process does not depend on the
resolution of those underlying questions about patent policy. Whether one thinks that current
patent law undercompensates for innovation or that its breadth deters future innovation,
improvements in accuracy and increases in stakes will both address the problem. The point we
wish to highlight is that increased accuracy and increased stakes are substitutes.
Although we make our two basic observations—that litigation is mistake-prone and that
higher stakes can correct some of that error—in the context of patent challenges, it also applies
outside patent law. In general, it is important to model not just the incentive effects of a given
legal rule but also the incentives to litigate that rule. Those litigation incentives can introduce
errors into application of the basic legal rule, reducing the efficacy of the rule. Moreover,
litigation errors can be corrected either by directly improving the accuracy of litigation or,
surprisingly in some cases, by increasing the stakes in litigation. Increasing stakes is a plausible
substitute for greater accuracy when litigants and courts, while not perfectly accurate, are at least
better than random at identifying truly legal and illegal behavior.
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